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RETHINKING THE PARAMETERS OF TRADEMARK USE IN 
ENTERTAINMENT 
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt* 
Abstract 
Trademark law is flawed in its approach to trademark uses in 
entertainment. Infringement turns on whether a consumer is likely to be 
confused into believing that a markholder sponsored or approved of the 
use. Because consumers are increasingly aware of product placement and 
other sponsored mark uses, this likelihood of confusion standard may be 
met, and infringement found, even for harmless and/or artistically relevant 
uses, such as uses for purposes of verisimilitude or uses that rely on a 
mark’s symbolic meaning to assist in conveying a work’s message. This 
increased likelihood of confusion chills speech by forcing content creators 
to choose between licensing marks and avoiding marks altogether. 
Ironically, because negative depictions of marks are less likely to confuse 
consumers and because trademark dilution law does not apply to 
expressive uses of marks, trademark law permits gratuitously negative 
depictions of marks, which may harm markholders. The result is a 
doctrinally imbalanced system that chills speech, increases the transaction 
costs of content creation, and disproportionately harms small or 
independent content creators, while still permitting potentially harmful 
uses.  
There is a solution to this problem: rather than applying the traditional 
likelihood of confusion and dilution analyses, unauthorized uses of marks 
should be permitted in an expressive setting unless the use is (1) not 
artistically relevant or (2) explicitly misleading. This test is based on 
factors identified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, but differs from that court’s analysis in two significant ways. 
First, the Rogers approach requires the court to perform a traditional 
likelihood of confusion analysis and then to balance likelihood of 
confusion against the public interest in freedom of expression. The 
proposed test avoids the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely. Second, 
the proposed test applies a presumption of artistic relevance. This simpler 
scheme would permit the use of marks as expressive tools, while 
encouraging content creators to seek permission for uses that are more 
likely to harm a mark’s source-identifying function. 
                                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor, Whittier Law School. J.D. Harvard Law School, B.A., Williams 
College. This Article was written in conjunction with a fellowship in intellectual property law at 
UCLA School of Law and work as an Adjunct Professor at the University of Southern California 
Gould School of Law. Thanks to Douglas Lichtman, Wendy Seltzer, Jane Shay Wald, Mary Ann 
Novak, Jonathan Weinberg, David Welkowitz, and the many other wise people who asked probing 
questions as I presented this paper as a work in progress. Andrew Weiss, Andrew Fogg, and Julia 
and Albert Rosenblatt also offered invaluable assistance. Thanks, also, to Judy Daar and the warm 
and welcoming faculty at the Whittier Law School. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world in which James Bond drove a Honda Civic instead of 
an Aston Martin and Carrie Bradshaw wore Birkenstocks instead of 
Manolo Blahniks.  
Envision Kanye West’s “Gold Digger” seeking a “car” and a “purse” 
instead of a “Benz” and a “Louis Vuitton.”  
Can the game Battlefield Vietnam seem as real without “Huey” 
helicopters (a brand owned by Bell Helicopter)? And what should The 
Devil Wear, if not Prada? 
Brand names tell stories. And yet, content creators’ decisions regarding 
whether and when to use trademarks in entertainment—films, television, 
music, visual art, fiction, video games—are increasingly influenced by the 
2
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desire to avoid trademark litigation and possible liability.1 This Article 
explores the principles that underlie current restrictions on the use of 
trademarks in entertainment, reevaluates those restrictions as they are 
applied in practice, and concludes that the current parameters must be 
clarified and adjusted in order to avoid a doctrinal imbalance that both 
overprotects and underprotects.  
This imbalance originates in an ambiguous doctrine that relies on 
consumers’ awareness of product placement and mark licensing practices 
and consumers’ own understanding of what the law requires as key 
elements in determining infringement (resulting in overprotection) while 
undervaluing the potential for harm that may result from an unfavorable 
depiction of a mark in an expressive setting (resulting in potential 
underprotection).  
Overprotection under current law results partially from the traditional 
“likelihood of confusion” analysis, which assesses whether consumers are 
likely to be misled into believing that a markholder has sponsored or 
approved a particular mark use.  In making this assessment, courts examine 
a number of factors: (1) the strength of the allegedly infringed mark; (2) 
the proximity (i.e. competitive similarity) of the goods represented by the 
mark; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion, 
including survey evidence; (5) overlap in marketing channels used by the 
goods; (6) the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised 
by the purchaser; (7) the alleged infringer’s intent in selecting the mark; 
and (8) the likelihood that the product lines will expand to compete with 
each other.2 Examining the factors, it is apparent that this analysis is 
primarily designed to address the problem of “passing off”—that is, when 
a mark is imitated or otherwise used to mislead consumers as to the source 
of goods or services that might compete with the markholder’s. But these 
factors are a poor tool for evaluating the question of “sponsorship or 
approval,” in which a mark is used to represent its own product or service, 
and the question is whether the mark’s owner sponsored or approved of the 
mark’s use. In the sponsorship-or-approval setting, the analysis must focus 
inordinately on consumer surveys (a frequent tool in assessing 
infringement), and the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis thus 
becomes overly susceptible to distortion from consumers’ growing 
awareness of product placement and other sponsored mark uses.  
Combined with risk aversion, pressure from insurance carriers, and a 
lack of clarity in the law, these factors have created a culture of over-
caution regarding the use of marks in entertainment, in which content 
creators frequently avoid the expressive use of marks and obscure 
unauthorized use of marks. This not only exacerbates consumers’ 
                                                                                                                     
 1. For expediency, the terms “trademark” and “mark” will be used throughout this Article to 
refer to trademarks, service marks, and trade dress. 
 2. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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misperceptions regarding when the use of marks must be authorized, but 
also unduly restricts the ability of content creators to depict the real world 
with authenticity (i.e., verisimilitude) and to use the expressive aspects of 
marks as cultural icons.  
At the same time, current law may also underprotect marks, by 
declining to find either confusion or dilution when a mark is gratuitously 
depicted in a negative light. Marks depicted in a negative light are 
generally not likely to confuse consumers into believing that the 
markholder has sponsored or approved of the use. Negative uses will 
therefore be permitted even when they may harm markholders by creating 
a negative association in the minds of consumers. Moreover, dilution laws, 
which would usually forbid such tarnishing depictions, are seldom applied 
to uses of marks in entertainment (positive or negative), because of 
ambiguities in the law and because of the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act’s provision that dilution occurs only when the use of a mark 
constitutes “commercial” speech rather than expressive speech.3 Thus, 
dilution law does not step in to address any potential harm that may arise 
from gratuitously negative depictions.  Ultimately, current law creates a 
doctrinally imbalanced system that chills speech, increases the transaction 
costs of content creation, and disproportionately harms small or 
independent content creators.  
To remedy this situation, the law should be clarified and adjusted to 
allow content creators the freedom to use marks without authorization in 
artistically relevant settings, while protecting markholders against 
gratuitously harmful depictions of marks. Both goals would be satisfied by 
replacing the traditional likelihood of confusion test and the dilution test in 
the expressive-use context with a simple two-pronged test, under which the 
use of a mark would be permitted unless the use is (1) not artistically 
relevant or (2) explicitly misleading. A use would be found to lack artistic 
relevance only if there were no artistic reason whatsoever to include the 
mark in the work. Uses for purposes of verisimilitude, symbolism, parody, 
practical necessity, or other artistic justifications would fall well within 
bounds of artistic relevance. As to the second prong, a use would be 
explicitly misleading if it contained an explicit and false representation that 
the markholder sponsored, approved of, or was affiliated with the work, or 
if the work explicitly called out the mark as part of promoting the work.  
This proposed test is a modification of a two-prong analysis introduced 
in Rogers v. Grimaldi, which deemed a trademark use worthy of First 
Amendment consideration if the use was (1) artistically relevant and (2) 
not explicitly misleading.4 The proposed test, however, differs from the 
                                                                                                                     
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006). 
 4. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999–1002 (2d Cir. 1989). This case conc rned the film 
Ginger and Fred, directed by Federico Fellini. Id. The film was not about Ginger Rogers and Fred 
Astaire; rather, it was about two Italian dancers who were nicknamed after the more famous duo. 
4
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Rogers analysis in two significant ways. First, Rogers requires the court to 
perform a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis in addition to the 
two-pronged test above and then to balance likelihood of confusion against 
the public interest in freedom of expression. The proposed test, on the 
other hand, avoids the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely. Second, 
unlike Rogers, the proposed test applies a presumption of artistic 
relevance, which adds clarity and tends to discourage speculative litigation.  
Social science research indicates that consumers are more likely to 
presume that the use of a mark is sponsored or approved and are more 
likely to come away with a negative perception of the mark if the use is not 
artistically relevant. Therefore, replacing the traditional likelihood of 
confusion or dilution analyses with this two-pronged test would not only 
capture the uses most likely to create a likelihood of confusion, but also 
capture the uses most likely to create trademark harm. In addition, by 
barring artistically irrelevant uses, the proposed test would eliminate 
gratuitously harmful uses, while permitting artistically relevant negative 
uses such as parody and criticism. Thus, the test would create a consistent 
standard that would allow content creators maximum freedom to use marks 
as expressive tools with minimum harm to markholders. 
Several commentators have written about the use of trademarks in 
entertainment. In particular, James Gibson has insightfully explored the 
expansion of trademark liability through the recursive impact of risk 
aversion, product placement, and doctrinal ambiguity,5 and others such as 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram and Daniel E. Newman have argued for greater 
freedom to use marks in entertainment.6 Other commentators have 
addressed government regulation of product placement in entertainment 
and the degree to which product placements should receive First 
Amendment protection.7 Scholars have paid much attention to the limits 
                                                                                                                     
Ginger Rogers sued the producers, arguing that the film’s title falsely implied that she sponsored or 
approved of the film. Id. Ruling against Rogers, the Second Circuit held that film titles are entitled 
to First Amendment protection, and applied a balancing test wherein trademark uses are protected 
as First Amendment speech if they are artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading, and the 
likelihood of confusion does not outweigh the public interest in free expression. Id. 
 5. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007). 
 6. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing The Border Between Trademarks And Free Speech: 
Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use In Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 908–10 
(2005); Daniel E. Newman, Portraying a Branded World, 2008 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. &  POL’Y 357, 
367–79 (2008). 
 7. William B. Lackey, Can Lois Lane Smoke Marlboros?: An Examination of the 
Constitutionality of Regulating Product Placement in Movies, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275, 276; 
Sandra Lee, Product Placement in the United States: A Revolution in Need of Regulation, 26 
CARDOZO ARTS &  ENT. L.J. 203, 212–13 (2008); Benjamin R. Mulcahy, That’s Advertainment!, 
LOS ANGELES LAW., May 2006, at 46; Matthew Savare, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood 
And Vine: The Business, Legal, And Creative Ramifications Of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT. 
L. REV. 331, 369–76 (2004); Scott Shagin & Matthew Savare, Lawyering at the Intersection of 
5
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that copyright law may impose on content creators’ ability to incorporate 
existing works into the context of larger expressive works, especially in the 
face of a lawsuit concerning the use of a copyrighted prop in the television 
show Roc,8 and other similar disputes.9 This has given rise to projects such 
as the Center for Social Media’s “Untold Stories: Creative Consequences 
of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers” (which 
addresses a variety of intellectual property issues) and “Documentary 
Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use,” (which focuses on 
copyright fair use).10 In the trademark context, a number of commentators 
have noted the expressive nature of trademarks, and identified ways in 
which trademark law may unduly chill speech.11 By comparison, relatively 
little exploration has taken place regarding the effect of trademark law on 
freedom of expression in light of the growing practice of product 
placement.12 While this Article builds on James Gibson’s work, it diverges 
                                                                                                                     
Madison and Vine: It’s About Brand Integration, ENT. &  SPORTS LAW., Fall 2005, at 34. 
 8. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 9. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX : MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE  IN THE 
HYBRID ECONOMY (2008) (discussing the incorporation of copyrighted works into other works); 
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN , COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 3–4 (2001); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 139, 151–53 (2009); Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 715, 722–28 (2007); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 433, 447–50 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine 
Harms Free Speech And How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545–47 (2004). 
 10. See generally PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE &  PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, UNTOLD 
STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY 
FILMMAKERS (2004), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/printable_rights 
report.pdf (addressing the impact of clearance culture on a variety of intellectual property issues); 
CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS ’  STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES FOR FAIR USE 
(2005), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/fair_use_final.pdf (focusing on copyright fair 
use issues in light of the clearance culture). 
 11. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the 
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 158–60; 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks As Language In The Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 400–12 (1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Expressive 
Genericity]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be 
Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA  J.L. &  
ARTS 123, 125–37 (1996) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols]; Tara J. Goldsmith, What’s 
Wrong With This Picture? When The Lanham Act Clashes With Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &  ENT. L.J. 821, 837–52 (1997); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 84 
TRADEMARK REP. 441, 454–58 (1994); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1710–13 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The 
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1728–31 (1999); William McGeveran, 
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 61–66 (2008).  
 12. Cf. MARJORIE HEINS &  TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., WILL FAIR USE 
SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005), 
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (discussing effect of trademark 
cease and desist demands on free expression). 
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from Gibson’s goal of slowing rights accretion and Gulasekaram’s free-
expression objective. Instead, this Article examines the roots and effects 
not only of trademark law’s overprotection of marks in entertainment, but 
also of its underprotection, and proposes a remedy for this doctrinal 
imbalance. 
Part II of this Article describes the legal and practical landscapes that 
have created this situation and the ways in which current doctrine leads to 
harmful results. Part III explores the failings of the current system, 
including its ambiguity and its failure to focus on the types of uses that are 
most likely to lead to trademark harm. Current doctrines such as classic fair 
use, nominative fair use, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
regulations, the requirement that a use does not infringe unless it uses the 
mark “as a trademark,” and the First Amendment analysis set forth in 
Rogers are, on their own, inadequate to redress these issues without more 
dramatic steps. The two-pronged analysis performed in Rogers is a good 
start, however. Because unauthorized uses are most likely to cause 
trademark harm if they appear without artistic justification, this Article 
proposes that courts examining the unauthorized use of a trademark in an 
expressive context should replace the traditional likelihood of confusion 
and dilution tests with an inquiry into whether the use is (1) not artistically 
relevant or (2) explicitly misleading. Under this proposal, expressive 
trademark uses that are artistically irrelevant or explicitly misleading 
would infringe, while expressive uses that are artistically relevant without 
being explicitly misleading would not, regardless of whether they satisfy a 
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis. This proposed test would 
permit the use of marks as expressive tools, while encouraging content 
creators to seek permission for uses that are more likely to harm a mark’s 
source-identifying function. 
II.   UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE 
 
To envision the ideal parameters for the use of trademarks in 
entertainment, it is helpful to begin by reviewing the considerations that 
shape the protection of trademarks in the first place.  Regarding the legal 
parameters, we must ask: What limitations exist on the use of trademarks, 
and why? What policies underlie a trademark owner’s right to prevent 
others from using its mark, and what policies underlie the limits placed on 
that right? Regarding the practical parameters, we must question: How are 
marks used as icons and communicative tools, and what are the limits on 
these uses (authorized or unauthorized)? What are the customs and 
practices of the entertainment industry regarding the use of marks, and how 
do these customs and practices influence the law? 
After analyzing these existing parameters, one can understand how they 
result in overprotection and underprotection, and how the rules and 
practices currently governing the use of trademarks in entertainment need 
to be adjusted. 
7
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A.  The Legal Landscape 
Trademarks exist primarily to identify the source of goods and services. 
The trademark system relies on the premise that when a consumer 
perceives a trademark in connection with a particular good or service, the 
consumer will associate that mark with a source for that good or service. 
The Lanham Act permits markholders to police the integrity of the system 
by ensuring that their marks are not used by others in ways likely to 
confuse consumers into believing falsely that the markholder produces, 
approves of, sponsors, or is otherwise affiliated with an unauthorized use 
of the mark.13 That way, consumers experience consistency; consumers 
who perceive a given trademark in connection with goods or services can 
assume accurately that the goods or services originated from or are 
associated with the same entity as other goods and services associated with 
that mark.14 Because consumers can trust that the holder of any given mark 
sponsors or approves of all goods or services identified by that mark, they 
can trust that goods sharing the same mark are likely to be the same or to 
have similar qualities.15 A glance at the cereal aisle of a supermarket 
demonstrates the practical utility of the system: trademarks allow 
consumers to trust that any two boxes that contain the “Cheerios” mark 
contain the same type of product as each other, any two boxes that contain 
the “General Mills” mark originate from the same company as each other, 
and any two boxes that contain the “Kashi” mark are both likely to contain 
cereal made from organic grain.  
The system protects markholders as well as consumers by allowing 
markholders to develop reputations. As the Supreme Court explained in 
1879, marks “are the symbols by which men engaged in trade and 
manufactures become known in the marts of commerce, by which their 
reputation and that of their goods are extended and published; and as they 
become better known, the profits of their business are enhanced.”16 Thus, a 
mark represents both a product and the markholder who stands behind it; 
every mark carries with it not only a message of product quality but also a 
brand image or corporate identity. Accordingly, a markholder may drive 
sales by developing a reputation for high-quality or stylish goods, and may 
enhance the selling power of its mark by developing a reputation for 
philanthropy, event sponsorship, or other activities that color its brand 
image.17 Trademark law therefore protects not only against confusion as to 
                                                                                                                     
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 14. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J.L. &  ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987). 
 15. Id. at 269–70. 
 16. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 87 (1879) (statement preceding opinion). Although 
the statement’s gendered language stands out as outdated, the core sentiment remains true today. 
 17. For example, McDonald’s sponsors the Ronald McDonald House Charities, see Ronald 
McDonald House Charities, http://www.rmhc.com/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009) (providing “a ‘home 
8
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the source of a product or service (and accompanying consumer confusion 
regarding product quality), but also against confusion as to markholder 
sponsorship or approval of a product or service. This latter type of 
protection allows markholders to safeguard their reputations and brand 
identities (as distinguished from product quality per se), but as discussed 
by commentators including Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna, this 
protection may also overreach in ways that unduly curb expression.18 This 
overreaching is at the core of the dilemma discussed in this Article. 
Overreaching aside, trademark protection exists for good reason.  When 
a mark is used in a way that is likely to confuse consumers or to dilute the 
source-identifying function of a famous mark, that use is likely to harm 
both consumers and markholders by harming the predictability function of 
the mark to consumers, diminishing the markholder’s incentive to create 
consistent goods, and undercutting the mark’s value to the markholder 
(among other things). In order to prevent these (related) harms, the Lanham 
Act prohibits two types of trademark uses: (1) uses likely to confuse 
consumers, and (2) uses likely to dilute the source-identifying function of a 
mark. 
Sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibit the unauthorized 
use of marks in a manner likely to confuse consumers.19 Specifically, the 
Lanham Act prohibits the use of marks in connection with the sale, 
distribution, or advertising of goods or services in a way that is likely to 
cause confusion as to affiliation, connection, or association with the 
markholder or confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of goods 
or services.20 The touchstone of infringement under these provisions is 
likelihood of confusion: Is the use of a mark likely to confuse consumers 
into believing falsely that a product or service is associated with the 
                                                                                                                     
away from home’ for families of seriously ill children receiving treatment at nearby hospitals”), 
Coca-Cola sponsors the Coca-Cola Refreshing Filmmaker’s Award, see Coca-Cola Refreshing 
Filmmaker’s Award, http://www.ccrfa.com/ccrfa/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009), (awarding annual 
monetary award and promotion for emerging filmmakers from America’s top film schools), and 
Acura visibly sponsors the Los Angeles Philharmonic, see, e.g., Press Release, Los Angeles 
Philharmonic, Dave Brubeck Quartet Kicks Off LA Phil’s 2008/09 Jazz Series at Walt Disney 
Concert Hall (Oct. 26, 2008), http://www.laphil.com/press/press_release/index.cfm?id=2317 
(“Concert generously sponsored by Acura, the official Automotive Sponsor of the Los Angeles 
Philharmonic [and] All Acura Vehicles Park Free for the Evening.”). Each of these enhances the 
brand’s image: McDonald’s comes across as child- and family-friendly, Coca-Cola as exciting and 
adventurous, and Acura as cultured and elegant. 
 18. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STANFORD L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://paper.ssrn.com/sol/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1407793#. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (relating to infringement of 
registered and unregistered marks, respectively). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (prohibiting the use of a mark that “is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the . . . origin, sponsorship, or approval 
of . . . goods, services, or commercial activities”). 
9
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markholder in any of the enumerated ways?21 The traditional likelihood of 
confusion test relies on a non-exclusive list of factors, including (1) the 
strength of the allegedly infringed mark; (2) the proximity (i.e. competitive 
similarity) of the goods; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of 
actual confusion, including survey evidence; (5) overlap in marketing 
channels used by the goods; (6) the type of goods and the degree of care 
likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) the alleged infringer’s intent in 
selecting the mark; and (8) the likelihood that the product lines will expand 
to compete with each other.22 
Whether confusion is found to be likely thus depends not only on 
factors such as the strength of the allegedly infringed mark and the 
similarity of the products, but also to some degree on consumers’ 
understanding of trademark law. If consumers believe that a particular kind 
of trademark use must always be authorized by the markholder, then 
consumers will infer that any such use implies sponsorship or approval by 
the markholder and an unauthorized use becomes, by definition, an 
infringement.23 Consumer surveys, a frequent tool in assessing 
infringement, reflect this effect.24 Such surveys often ask whether 
consumers believe that “permission” was required for the challenged use, 
in essence translating consumers’ opinions about the relevant law into a 
ruling on infringement.25 
In addition to prohibiting uses likely to confuse, the Lanham Act bars 
the unauthorized use of marks in a manner likely to weaken (or “dilute”) 
the source-identifying function of those marks, even if the use is not 
confusing. Specifically, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act prohibits uses that 
are likely to dilute famous trademarks through “blurring,” which is creating 
an association that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark; or 
“tarnishment,” which is creating an association that harms the reputation of 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Id. 
 22. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 23. Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989); Gibson, supra note 5, 
at 907–08. 
 24. Gibson, supra note 5, at 907–08. Consumer surveys are considered evidence of “actual 
confusion.” Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 1998). They have 
become important litigation tools and are sufficiently commonplace that failure to present survey 
evidence may be held against a markholder in the form of a presumption that actual confusion is 
unlikely. See id. (relying on “presumption that plaintiffs’ failure to conduct a survey indicates the 
results of such a survey would be unfavorable for plaintiffs”). 
 25. See, e.g., CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544 (5th Cir. 1998); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1994); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel 
I), 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1132–33 (C.D. Cal. 1998). But see Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 
525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (criticizing “permission” surveys as seeking a legal 
conclusion). 
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the famous mark.26 The Lanham Act excludes from dilution liability 
certain types of uses deemed to be “fair” for dilution purposes, such as 
comparative advertising, parody and criticism of the markholder, and news 
reporting and commentary.27 In addition, the  Lanham Act contains two 
provisions that limit dilution liability to commercial uses—first, the Act 
applies only to use of a mark “in commerce,”28 and second, the Act 
explicitly exempts from liability any “noncommercial use of a mark.”29 
This non-commercial use exemption tracks the distinction between 
commercial and expressive use in the First Amendment context, wherein a 
use that does more than simply propose a commercial transaction is 
deemed non-commercial.30 
Dilution’s non-commercial use exemption is one of several trademark 
doctrines designed to ensure that trademark does not unduly abridge 
speech. A trademark holder does not have the unfettered right to exclude 
others from using its mark. This differs from patent and copyright law: 
Patent holders have the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling their inventions,31 and copyright holders have the right to exclude 
others from doing the bundle of activities protected by copyright law.32 In 
contrast, trademark holders have the right to exclude others from using 
their marks only to the extent that such use is confusing or dilutive as 
                                                                                                                     
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). In the words of the Ninth Circuit, dilution occurs where use of a 
trademark “whittle[s] away . . . the value of a trademark” by “blurring [its] uniqueness and 
singularity” or by “tarnishing [it] with negative associations.” Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 
(Mattel II), 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006). 
 30. See Mattel II, 296 F.3d at 905–06 (analyzing legislative history and ruling that the song 
Barbie Girl was not a commercial use and thus did not dilute Mattel’s mark). Generally, courts 
afford the greatest degree of First Amendment protection to news and political information. See, 
e.g., Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Constitution 
stands as a safe harbor for all but the most malicious political speech.”). Entertainment speech 
enjoys a slightly lesser degree of First Amendment protection. See Schad v. Borough of Mount 
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is 
protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such 
as musical and dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee.”); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The law generally recognizes a 
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”). The First Amendment 
shields commercial speech to a significantly lesser degree. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 
U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (“Although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, not all 
regulation of such speech is unconstitutional.”). The profit-making nature of entertainment speech 
does not render it “commercial.” See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) 
(“That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them 
from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to 
see why operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of motion pictures.”).  
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
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defined by the Lanham Act. This distinction reflects the origins of each 
type of protection; copyright and patent law originate in the Constitution’s 
promise of an intellectual property system that “promote[s] the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”33 Trademark law, on the other hand, finds its roots in the 
Commerce Clause.34 Thus, trademark law is less concerned with providing 
exclusive rights than it is with facilitating the commercial, i.e. source-
identifying, function of marks. Hence the rule of thumb that a trademark is 
not a “right in gross.”35 
In that spirit, trademark doctrine is designed to prevent, to the extent 
possible, any constriction of the public vocabulary.36 Ideally, trademarks 
should expand the universal lexicon by providing communicative tools that 
represent products and services, rather than removing communicative tools 
from public use.37 Thus, a generic term, i.e. the common descriptive name 
of a particular good or service, such as the term “apple” to describe apples, 
cannot be protected as a trademark.38 Permitting protection for such terms 
would risk leaving the public without a non-branded way of describing a 
                                                                                                                     
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); see In re Trade-Mark 
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–95 (1879).  
 35. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1918) (noting a 
trademark is not a “right in gross” and “[t]he owner of a trade-mark may not, like the proprietor of a 
patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly”). See Lemley, 
supra note 11, at 1696–97 (discussing policy basis for adage that trademark is not a right in gross). 
 36. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 215 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“When a business claims the exclusive right to use words or phrases that are a part of 
our common vocabulary, this Court should not depart from the statutorily mandated authority to 
‘rectify the register,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1119, absent a clear congressional mandate. Language, even in a 
commercial context, properly belongs to the public unless Congress instructs otherwise.”); Car-
Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting importance of 
“protect[ing] the right of society at large to use words or images in their primary descriptive 
sense”); Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[O]ne competitor 
will not be permitted to impoverish the language of commerce by preventing his fellows from fairly 
describing their own goods”); Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 1320 
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (recognizing the importance of the “free use of the language” in the trademark 
context); see also Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461 and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. 
on Trade-Marks of the H. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 72 (1941) (testimony of Wallace Martin, 
Chairman, American Bar Association Committee on Trade-Mark Legislation) (“Everybody has got 
a right to the use of the English language and has got a right to assume that nobody is going to take 
that English language away from him.”). 
 37. See Mattel II, 296 F.3d at 900 (“Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a 
contemporary flavor to our expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark 
becomes a word in our language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”); 
Lemley, supra note 11, at 1696 (discussing the danger of cultural impoverishment when trademarks 
are removed from vocabulary). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
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type of good or service.39 For the same reason, a trademark becomes 
unprotectably generic when it becomes the common descriptive name of a 
type of good or service such that the public no longer perceives the term as 
a source identifier (such as “escalator” or “cellophane”).40 Likewise, a term 
that is necessarily generic cannot be protected as a trademark even if 
consumers have come to associate it with a particular brand, such as 
AOL’s use of the generic term “You’ve Got Mail.”41 
By the same token, a descriptive term (for example, the term “PARK 
‘N FLY” to describe airport parking) cannot be protected as a trademark 
unless and until it has acquired “secondary meaning,” also known as 
“acquired distinctiveness.”42 This occurs when “the primary significance of 
the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the 
producer.”43 The reasoning behind this is clear: when a term describes a 
particular product or service, it is unduly burdensome on the public 
vocabulary to prevent the public from using the term in connection with 
that product or service, unless the aspiring markholder can establish that 
the term functions as a source identifier rather than a descriptor.44  
While these statutory provisions may be aimed at facilitating 
competition as much as speech, other provisions are even more clearly 
aimed at ensuring that trademark law does not constrict the common 
vocabulary or abridge protected speech. For example, the statutory doctrine 
                                                                                                                     
 39. This doctrine also has a commercial function. SeeTy Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 
528, 531–32 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Imagine the pickle that sellers would be in if they were forbidden to 
use ‘brassiere,’ ‘cellophane,’ ‘escalator,’ ‘thermos,’ ‘yo-yo,’ or ‘dry ice’ to denote products-all 
being former trademarks that have become generic terms. The problem is not that language is so 
impoverished that no other words could be used to denote these products, but that if no other words 
have emerged as synonyms it may be difficult for a seller forbidden to use one of the trademarked 
words or phrases to communicate effectively with consumers.”). 
 40. Id.; see 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
§ 12:18 (4th ed. 2009) (including list of terms deemed to have become generic). 
 41. Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 822–23 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 42. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 215 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 43. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). 
 44. See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323–24 (1871) (explaining this principle prior to the advent of the Lanham 
Act: “[T]he owner of an original trade-mark has an undoubted right to be protected in the exclusive 
use of all the marks, forms, or symbols, that were appropriated as designating the true origin or 
ownership of the article or fabric to which they are affixed; but he has no right to the exclusive use 
of any words, letters, figures, or symbols, which have no relation to the origin or ownership of the 
goods, but are only meant to indicate their names or quality. He has no right to appropriate a sign or 
a symbol, which, from the nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may employ with equal 
truth, and therefore have an equal right to employ for the same purpose.”). Similarly, colors cannot 
be protected as trademarks unless the color serves as a trademark (i.e. has acquired secondary 
meaning) and has no significant non-trademark function. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 
514 U.S. 159, 169–70 (1995) (secondary meaning and non-functionality requirements will prevent 
trademark law from unduly restricting color vocabulary). 
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of “classic trademark fair use” provides that a descriptive mark may be 
used in a descriptive manner, even if doing so creates consumer 
confusion.45 Courts have also adopted the doctrine of “nominative fair 
use,” which holds that marks can be used to identify the markholder’s good 
or service when it is the only practical way to identify the good or service, 
provided that no more of the mark is used than necessary, and the use does 
nothing to imply sponsorship beyond the use of the mark.46 Thus, a 
newspaper running a story about the musical group “New Kids on the 
Block”  can identify the band by name,47 and a visual artist whose art piece 
makes a statement about the cultural impact of Barbie can incorporate the 
doll’s trade dress into the art piece.48 Although these uses could lead to 
confusion or dilution, the doctrine loosens the markholder’s control over 
uses of its mark in order to maintain ease of communication and facilitate 
free speech.49 
Even more directly aimed at protecting First Amendment speech are the 
dilution statute’s exceptions for “all forms of news reporting and news 
commentary,” and for “any noncommercial use of a mark,”50 and the 
doctrine first articulated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers 
v. Grimaldi,51 that the Lanham Act should be construed to apply to artistic 
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion 
outweighs the public interest in First Amendment free expression.52 The 
Rogers court held that this First Amendment analysis would be triggered 
by the use of a mark in the title of an artistic work “unless the title has no 
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some 
artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the 
content of the work.”53 The Rogers doctrine has not been applied 
                                                                                                                     
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (noting it is a defense to trademark infringement “[t]hat 
the use . . . charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of . . . a term or device 
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of 
such party, or their geographic origin”); Id. § 1125(c)(3) (excluding “[a]ny fair use, including a 
nominative or descriptive fair use” from dilution liability); see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. 
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121–22 (2004) (“some possibility of consumer confusion 
must be compatible with fair use . . . . The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion 
on the part of consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an originally 
descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing 
anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.”). 
 46. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 47. Id. at 309. 
 48. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (Walking Mountain), 353 F.3d 792, 808, 812 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006) (excluding “[a]ny fair use, including a nominative or 
descriptive fair use” from dilution liability). 
 50. Id. § 1125(c)(3)(B)–(C) (2006). 
 51. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 52. Id. at 999. 
 53. Id. 
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consistently in other circuits.54 In circuits that apply the Rogers standard, a 
gradual consensus has arisen that it should apply to uses of marks in the 
body of an expressive work as well as titular uses.55 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Although the Rogers test has been explicitly endorsed in some circuits, see Westchester 
Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664–65 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Twin Peaks 
Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting Rogers standard 
with proviso that infringement will still be found if “likelihood of confusion [is] ‘particularly 
compelling’”)); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel II, 296 F.3d 
894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002), it has been criticized as overly subjective in its requirement that courts 
assess artistic relevance, s e 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 10:31, and has been explicitly avoided 
in some circuits, see Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (explicitly 
declining to decide whether to adopt Rogers standard). Moreover, even those circuits that have 
adopted the test in some contexts have not uniformly applied the rule to all First Amendment 
claims, see Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396, 1403 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (relying on pre-Rogers cases to reject a First Amendment defense to trademark 
infringement regarding a book about O.J. Simpson styled after “The Cat in the Hat”); Tri-Star 
Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time Prods., B.V., 749 F. Supp. 1243, 1252–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting 
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998 (noting that Rogers does not apply to “‘confusingly similar titles’” and 
holding that Rogers does not protect the film Return From The River Kwai from claim by producers 
of Bridge Over The River Kwai)), and other circuits have sought to balance First Amendment 
considerations using a different standard, seeAnheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 
769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that First Amendment did not protect use of mark in parodic 
context when the use was likely to confuse and “the confusion [as opposed to the use of the mark] is 
wholly unnecessary to Balducci’s stated purpose”) (emphasis added); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the 
“likelihood of confusion” test “serve[s] to avoid First Amendment concerns” in the case of 
trademark parodies; holding that First Amendment trumped any likelihood of confusion regarding 
parody baseball cards without applying Rogers v. Grimaldi standard).  
 55. Compare Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 808 n.14 (expressing uncertainty regarding 
whether Rogers standard should be applied to non-titular uses), and Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1015–16 
(expressing skepticism re: same), with ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918, 936–37 
(6th Cir. 2003) (applying Rogers to a commemorative sports painting of Tiger Woods’s victory at 
the Masters golf tournament in 1997), and Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g 
Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying balancing test to a rade dress case concerning 
the cover of a book, but without reliance on “artistic relevance” standard), an  E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1014, 1039–40 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (applying 
Rogers to use of “Pig Pen” strip club in video game content in suit by owners of “Play Pen” strip 
club mark), and Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 276–78 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (finding that Defendant’s use of certain elements of the cover design of the Old Farmer’s 
Almanac to “make[] a joking reference to the Almanac, as part of a socio-economic commentary,” 
was “entitled to the protections explained by the Court of Appeals in Rogers v. Grimaldi and Cliffs 
Notes”), and Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1551–
53 (S.D. Fla.1990) (holding, in a case where the owner of the trademark “Star Brite” sued the 
producers of a fictional television movie that portrayed a fictional company called “Starbrite 
Batteries” in a bad light, that the film was “entitled to the full extent of protection afforded by the 
[F]irst [A] mendment” but ruling on likelihood of confusion rather than First Amendment grounds); 
see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 10:22 (quoting Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495 (“The courts 
have expanded the Rogers balancing approach to encompass all ‘works of artistic expression.’”)). 
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B.  The Practical Landscape 
There are a number of reasons a mark might be used in entertainment.  
Marks can serve as communicative tools, can express verisimilitude or 
characterization, or can act as cultural markers; or marks may be used 
because it would be impossible or impractical to make a work without 
them.  In theory, content creators have many choices in how to approach 
the use of marks:  A content creator may accept promotional consideration 
in exchange for incorporating a mark into a work; a content creator may 
compensate a markholder for the use of its mark; or a content creator may 
use a mark without authorization.  As a practical matter, however, industry 
custom, insurance requirements, and fear of trademark litigation have 
combined to create a “clearance culture” that forces creators to seek 
permission for the use of marks.  This increases transaction costs and leads, 
ultimately, to stifled creativity and chilled speech.  Before discussing how 
to address these harmful effects, one must first understand their origin and 
operation. 
1.  Marks as Expression 
Several commentators have recognized the value of marks as cultural 
icons and communicative tools.56 Because of their ubiquity and symbolic 
purpose, marks carry information beyond their mere source-identifying 
function.  Content creators therefore frequently include marks for purposes 
of verisimilitude, to identify fiction occurring in a particular time and place 
in the real world, or in non-fiction works (such as documentaries) as a 
reflection of the world of the documentary subject.57 For example, the 
video game Battlefield Vietnam included Bell Huey helicopters to signify 
that its action takes place in the Vietnam War;58 the show Entourage uses 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 11 (proposing that marks should be 
deemed “generic” for purposes of infringement liability when they are used in their “signaling” 
sense as cultural icons in expressive contexts); Kozinski, supra note 11, at 454–58 (observing the 
expressive capability of marks: “Some ideas—‘it’s the Rolls-Royce of its class,’ for example—are 
difficult to express any other way.”); Litman, supra note 11, at 1730 (discussing value of 
trademarks that transcends source identification); Newman, supra note 6 (discussing cultural value 
of trademarks). 
 57. See Lauren P. Smith, Trademarks and the Movies: “An Af-’Fair Use’ to Remember, 48 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 415 (2000). 
 58. Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint at 4, Bell Helicopter Textron Inc v. Elect. Arts Inc., No. 
4:2006cv00841 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2006).  When the game was released by Electronic Arts in 2003, 
players could elect the Bell 205 (“Huey”) helicopter as a transportation option, as well as Bell AH-1 
“Cobra” and AH-1Z “Super Cobra” options. Bell Helicopter sued Electronic Arts for trademark 
infringement, arguing that the presence of its helicopters in the game implied Bell’s sponsorship or 
affiliation with the game. Id. The case settled on February 15, 2008 after more than a year of 
litigation. Players are no longer permitted to elect the Huey as a transportation option (the Huey 
image is now identified only as a “transport helicopter”), but other branded transportation options 
remain, including Boeing’s CH-47 Chinook helicopter. 
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real brands and locations to underscore the fact that it is set in the 
contemporary Hollywood scene;59 the show Mad Men uses real period 
marks and advertisements to demonstrate that it intends to depict a story 
taking place in the real world of 1960s advertising;60 reality television 
show The Hills portrays its characters visiting real locations around Los 
Angeles to show the world that they live in;61 and the film Super Size Me 
uses the McDonald’s mark to identify its documentary subject.62 
In addition, marks often gain cultural meaning, often as a result of their 
source-identifying function. For example, the Rolls Royce and Louis 
Vuitton marks connote luxury and wealth; the McDonalds mark connotes 
ubiquity and cheapness (not only in reference to its own products, but also 
to coinages such as “McMansion”); and the Betty Crocker mark connotes 
old-fashioned wholesomeness. Such cultural meaning may exist as a result 
of markholders’ attempts to build brand identity (as with many luxury 
brands) or despite it (as may be argued for the image of Mattel’s Barbie as 
superficial or brainless). 
Because of the expressive power of brand identity and the cultural 
markers that attach to marks, they are valuable communicative tools in 
entertainment. For example, they may be used for purposes of 
characterization and location identification. A mark can serve as shorthand 
for all of its cultural implications. If, in the context of an entertainment 
product, we see one person drinking San Pellegrino water and another 
drinking Arrowhead water, we instantly know something about these two 
individuals and how they may differ from each other.63 A shopping mall 
anchored by a Sears and a Target comes across as a very different place 
from one anchored by a Macy’s and a Lord & Taylor. And a parking lot 
populated by BMWs and Mercedes is likely to sit outside a very different 
location from one populated by Hondas and Fords—or, for that matter, one 
populated by Ferraris and Lamborghinis. This sort of characterization 
works on an immediate, largely unconscious level. For example, the viewer 
gains an instant understanding of the penurious heroine in Pretty in Pink 
and the wealthy cad she loves just by seeing her beat-up-but-quirky VW 
Karmann Ghia and his new BMW.64  
                                                                                                                     
 59. Tim Stack, Boy Brands, ENT. WKLY ., July 22, 2005, at 18 (noting Entourage show creator 
Doug Ellin describes his use of real brands on the show: “I pick stuff that I use or people in the 
world use. We try to make it realistic.”). 
 60. Robert Simonson, Sixties Accuracy in Every Sip, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2009, at D4, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/dining/12don.html?_r=2&hpw. 
 61. The Hills, (MTV 2006). Indeed, the use of real brands and locations tends to reinforce the 
semi-scripted show’s status as “reality” television. 
 62. SUPER SIZE ME (The Con 2004). 
 63. The characters in Robert Altman’s The Player (Avenue Pictures Productions, 1992) 
ordered different brands of bottled water at various times in the movie, in a subtle application of 
this technique. 
 64. PRETTY IN PINK (Paramount Pictures, 1986); see Denise E. DeLorme & Leonard N. Reid, 
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2.  Product Placement 
Marks may also be included in entertainment as the result of a product 
placement arrangement. Product placement (sometimes referred to as 
“embedded marketing”) occurs when a specific product or brand is 
incorporated into entertainment in exchange for some sort of compensation 
by the markholder.65 Sometimes this compensation is in the form of free 
goods for use in the production; frequently, however, the compensation 
involves cash payment, free advertising, or some combination of all 
three.66 Product placement may range from the display of a product or its 
mark as part of a background tableau to the use of a product or service by a 
character, to increasingly popular practices known as “product integration” 
or “brand integration,” which are defined as the “seamless weaving of a 
manufactured product [or service] into the storyline of an entertainment 
production.”67  
Product placement and brand integration are on the rise, but they are not 
new. They appeared in pre-Civil War songs and in Charles Dickens’ 
Pickwick Papers.68 The first reported on-screen product placement 
occurred shortly after the invention of the movie, when in 1896 the 
Lumiere brothers filmed women washing clothes with Lever Brothers’ 
Sunlight Soap placed in a prominent position. The film was given the 
English title Washing Day in Switzerland and Lever Brothers provided 
Swiss film distribution in exchange for the favorable treatment.69 In the 
decades that followed, markholders frequently provided free goods to film 
producers in exchange for screen time and reciprocal advertising benefits, 
and sponsored radio and television shows, which created branded 
entertainment such as soap operas.70 The practice of paid product 
placement—that is, the inclusion of a brand or product in exchange for a 
fee—took off in the 1950s, following its use in the 1949 Marx brothers’ 
                                                                                                                     
Moviegoers’ Experiences and Interpretations of Brands in Films Revisited, XXVII JOURNAL OF 
ADVERTISING 2, at 71, 79 (Summer 1999) (“To moviegoers in both studies, regardless of age and 
moviegoing frequency, brand placement was significant in that it provided relevant information 
about the character’s personality, lifestyle, and role in the movie plot.”). 
 65. Savare, supra note 7, at 333. 
 66. Savare, supra note 7, at 333. 
 67. Product Integrators, Inc., Interactive Product Placement, Slide Presentation, 
http://www.productintegrators.com/pres1/slide1.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 68. Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon & Susan Chang, The Hidden History of Product 
Placement, J. BROADCASTING &  ELECTRONIC MEDIA (2006), available at 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/162470371_1.html (detailing the history of paid 
product placement, including paid placements in art and fiction in the Eighteenth Century). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. These practices have continued. In 1998, it was estimated that 90% or more of product 
placements are done on a barter basis, where the product or service is simply traded for exposure in 
the program. James A. Karrh, Kathy Brittain McKee & Carol J. Pardun, Practitioners’ Evolving 
Views on Product Placement Effectiveness, 43 J. ADVERTISING RES. 138, 139 (2003).  
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film Love Happy.71 Since the paid placement dam burst in the 1950s, the 
practice has risen in popularity from a practice that few had ever noticed or 
heard of to one that is nearly ubiquitous. Its popularity has especially 
ballooned since the appearance of Reese’s Pieces in the film E.T., The 
Extra-Terrestrial (and associated synergistic marketing) was famously 
reputed to temporarily triple sales of the candy.72 Since then, the list of 
prominent product placements and the types of entertainment in which they 
appear has grown to a degree that it would be impossible to list them all: 
BMWs and Aston Martins in James Bond films;73 Coca-Cola products on 
American Idol;74 Bulgari jewelry in the book The Bulgari Connection;75 
Seagram’s Gin in hip-hop music;76 and Burger King in Electronic Arts’ 
video game Fight Night Round 3.77 The product placement industry 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon & Susan Chang, The Hidden History of Product 
Placement, J. BROADCASTING &  ELECTRONIC MEDIA (2006), available at 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/162470371_1.html. In a climactic sequence, 
Harpo Marx escapes with stolen diamonds by running past a number of neon billboards including 
one for Baby Ruth candy and one for Fisk tires; riding the Mobil Oil “Pegasus” mascot; and 
swinging from a gigantic Bulova clock pendulum into the mouth of a smoking Kool penguin. Id. 
Signage rights were sold in advance to various entities including Socony for $25,000, Curtiss Baby 
Ruth for $25,000, and Bulova Watches for $4,500 plus $150,000 in advertising. Id. Fisk tires paid 
$2,000 for its momentary appearance. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Product Integration is as Old as Hollywood Itself, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Apr. 28, 
2005, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content 
_id=1000901394. 
 74. Nate Anderson, Product Placement Still Huge as Advertisers Fight DVRs, ARS TECHNICA, 
Sept. 17, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080917-product-placement-still-huge-as-
advertisers-fight-dvrs.html (noting that from January through June, 2008, American Idol featured 
4,636 placements, most of them for Coca-Cola, which was the most-placed product during the first 
half of 2008); see also Michael A. Wiles & Anna Danielova, The Worth of Product Placement in 
Successful Films: An Event Study Analysis, 73 J. MARKETING 44, 54 (July 2009) (referencing chart 
containing a relatively small but still impressive list of product placements in major release feature 
films). 
 75. FAY WELDON, THE BULGARI CONNECTION 14 (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000). Another 
example is Timex, which was approached with a deal to weave its products into the plot of a Tom 
Clancy book, movie, CD-ROM, and Internet game for $1.3 million. Michelle R. Nelson, Recall of 
Brand Placements in Computer/Video Games, 42 J. ADVERTISING RES. 80, 81 (2002). 
 76. For example, Petey Pablo’s Freek-a-leek, which reached  number 2 on the Billboard Rap 
Charts, included the lyrics: “Now I got to give a shout out to Seagram’s Gin/Cause I’m drinkin’ it 
and they payin’ me for it.” See Krissah Williams, In Hip-Hop, Making Name-Dropping Pay, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 29, 2005, at D1. 
 77. Mike Musgrove, Advertisers Are Getting Into the Game, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at 
D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/01/AR20060 
30102285.html. “Nielsen Entertainment, the television tracking firm,” estimates that video game 
product placement and in-game advertisement would “grow to [be a] $1 billion [business] by 
2010.” Id.; see also Michelle R. Nelson, Heejo Keum & Ronald A. Yaros, Advertainment or 
Adcreep? Game Players’ Attitudes toward Advertising and Product Placements in Computer 
Games, 5 J. INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING (2004), available at http://www.jiad.org/article52 
(discussing various product placements in video games); Nelson, supra note 75, at 83–84 (including 
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continues to grow, as well.78 Encouraged by marketing agencies, the 
popularity of product placement has grown more quickly in recent years. 
From April 2005 to December 2007 alone, instances of product placement 
in television grew by 40%.79 Industry experts predict that product 
placement expenditures will increase at a compounded rate of about 15% 
per annum through 2009 and that product placement will be a $7.55 billion 
market by 2010.80 Indeed, in the current production climate, it is 
exceedingly rare—approaching nonexistent—for a nationally released 
feature film or television show not to feature any product placement.81 
This growth in popularity can be attributed to a number of factors. For 
one thing, product placement is good for markholders. Consumer behavior 
can be tracked directly to entertainment content, including product 
placement. In addition to the boost Reese’s Pieces received from its 
appearance in E.T., sales of undershirts are estimated to have dropped 40% 
after Clark Gable unbuttoned his shirt to reveal a bare chest in the film It 
Happened One Night,82 and sales of Pinot Noir (of all brands) increased 
over 22% after the wine variety was praised in the film Sideways.83 Study 
participants who viewed the movie Wayne’s World in its entirety reported a 
purchase intention for placed brands that was 16% higher than for brands 
they had previously identified as “favorites.”84 Further, product placement 
                                                                                                                     
chart identifying examples and types of product placements in video games). 
 78. The dozens of firms who specialize in facilitating product placement and other forms of 
“branded entertainment” have their own trade association, the Association of Entertainment 
Marketing Professionals, which describes itself as “the entertainment industry’s association for 
product placement agencies whose members represent corporations for the express purpose of 
handling branded integration, product placement and promotions for feature films, television and 
music videos.” Entertainment Resources & Marketing Association (ERMA), ERMA Bylaws, 
http://www.emainc.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=4&id= 
46&Itemid=47 (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). ERMA member information is available at ERMA’s 
website.  See ERMA, http://www.emainc.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 79. Kenneth C. Wilbur et al., Effects of Advertising and Product Placement on Television 
Audiences 1–2 (USC Marshall School of Business Marshall Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
MKT 09-09, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1151507. 
 80. Kai Falkenberg & Elizabeth McNamara, Using Trademarked Products In Entertainment 
Programming, 24 A.B.A. COMM. LAW. 1, 1 n.2, 13 (2007) (citing the PQ Media Global Product 
Placement Forecast 2006-2010); Steven N. Lewis, Branded Entertainment and Product 
Integration: A Revolution in its Infancy, 23 ENT. &  SPORTS L. 1, 11 (2006) (citing to the PQ Media 
LLC projected product placement forecast for 2006–2010). 
 81. See generally WRITERS’  GUILD OF AM., “A RE YOU SELLING TO ME?” STEALTH 
ADVERTISING IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY (2005), available at http://www.wga.org/uploaded 
Files/news_and_events/press_release/2005/white_paper.pdf (discussing proliferation of product 
integration in feature films and television shows). 
 82. IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT (Columbia Pictures Corporation 1934). 
 83. SIDEWAYS (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2004); Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, 
at 1. 
 84. Siva K. Balasubramanian, James A. Karrh & Hemant Patwardhan, Audience Response to 
Product Placements: An Integrative Framework and Future Research Agenda, 35 J. ADVERTISING 
115, 133 (2006).  
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is generally less expensive for markholders than traditional advertising,85 
and in many cases is more likely to reach viewers, as more traditional 
methods of advertising have become more expensive and less effective. 
Audiences have fragmented into a wide range of entertainment sources, 
including cable television, the Internet, and mobile content, while 
technology and market saturation have inured consumers to more 
traditional advertising techniques. Moreover, advertising in nearly every 
marketing channel has become more expensive, and competition has 
tightened.86 Specifically, in the television context, consumers’ ability to 
skip commercials using VCRs and (especially) DVRs has eroded consumer 
advertising attention. These factors have combined to inspire an increasing 
number of advertisers to explore product placement as an avenue for 
connecting with consumers.87  
At the same time, rising production costs have made product placement 
more appealing to content creators of all types and sizes.88 For small or 
independent producers, product placements may be difficult to secure 
(because such productions may not be able to promise large audiences)—
but even so, a paid placement can make the difference between making a 
work and not being able to afford it.89 For large-scale productions, the 
sums paid for conspicuous placement of a product may be at least as 
influential—and they are rising. As recently as 1990, the Walt Disney 
Company priced a product placement episode with visual, visual + brand-
name mention, and actual product use content at $20,000, $40,000, and 
$60,000, respectively.90 In 2002, a single placement of a detergent on a 
sitcom could yield from nearly $23,000 (the sum paid for a seven-second 
close up of Sunlight brand detergent on the sitcom Everybody Loves 
Raymond) to over $225,000 (for a character’s use of Snuggle detergent on 
Friends).91 From 2004 to 2005, companies including Burger King, Dove 
Body Wash, Sony PlayStation, Verizon Wireless, and Visa each paid an 
estimated $2 million to $2.5 million to be incorporated into the plot lines 
of The Apprentice.92 More recent studies suggest that the practice could 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Savare, supra note 7, at 356–57. 
 86. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 13. 
 87. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 13; Savare, supra note 7, at 332–33. 
 88. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 7. 
 89. Savare, supra note 7, at 359 (noting markholders and their agents consider distribution 
prospects in determining whether and on what terms to place a product); i . at 371 n.270 
(“[P]roduct placement agencies generally do not pay much attention to films that they deem do not 
have a viable chance of being distributed. . . . [These agencies] ‘are unwilling to support chancier 
projects that are in far greater need of support.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 90. Balasubramanian et al., supra note 84, at 134. 
 91. Louis Chunovic, Trying To Price Placement: Kraft, Unilever View ITVX Service that 
Claims to Put Value on Product Appearances, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 2, 2002, at 4. Information 
on placement pricing is scant, as producers and networks generally do not release the terms of such 
arrangements. Wilbur et al., supra note 79, at 13.  
 92. Stuart Elliott, Burger King Moves Quickly to Take a Product from TV to the Table, N.Y. 
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reduce the feature film industry’s production costs by 25%.93 Thus, product 
placement is symbiotic, giving markholders a relatively inexpensive way of 
disseminating advertising to a large viewing audience, while providing 
content creators with an additional source of funding.94  
Also notable is the degree to which the consuming public has become 
aware of the practice of product placement. The practice is so ubiquitous 
that consumers have come to expect that blockbuster movies will contain 
product placements. They are accustomed to gratuitous and lingering shots 
of James Bond’s cell phone with the “Ericsson” logo clearly visible, and by 
the startup screen of a computer on Fox’s 24 howing nothing but the logo 
for Cisco Systems. Consumers cannot help but know that they are on the 
receiving end of product placement; the signals are all around them. Even 
if consumers would not naturally assume that the products they see in 
entertainment are placed, the press and popular culture tell them so.95 
Indeed, more than ten thousand news articles have been published 
regarding product placement in the last three years.96 Of the 651 articles on 
product placement that have appeared in the New York Times ince 1981, 
more than half were printed within the last five years.97 The press has also 
perpetuated an overly-expansive view of trademark law’s reach. For 
example, an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education warned that 
“[f]leeting references to actual institutions should qualify as ‘fair use’ 
                                                                                                                     
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/21/business/media/ 
21adco.html. 
 93. Kim Bartel Sheehan & Aibing Guo, “Leaving on a (Branded) Jet Plane”: An Exploration 
of Audience Attitudes Towards Product Assimilation in Television Content, 27 J. CURRENT ISSUES &  
RES. ADVERTISING 79, 80 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 
 94. Savare, supra note 7, at 356–57 (discussing symbiotic benefits of product placement to 
markholders and content creators). Savare notes that some also credit product placement with 
adding to verisimilitude in entertainment, while others point out that most product placements are 
gratuitous and exist for purely economic reasons. Id. at 357–58. 
 95. For example, Antrepo Design Industry, a graphic design firm based in Turkey, has gained 
attention in the United States through its blog. See ANTREPO4, A2591, http://a2591.blogspot.com/ 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2009). The firm’s output includes a set of movie posters that contain nothing 
but the name of the film and the brands featured in the film. Id. (follow hyperlink “Type PS 
(Posters)” under “Container Type”). Posters include Iron Man, The Matrix Trilogy, The Bourne 
Ultimatum, Kill Bill Vol. 1, Ocean’s Eleven, and The Dark Knight. Id. Interestingly, while Antrepo 
has named the poster set “Movie Posters With Brand Integration,” the posters list (nearly) all brands 
(including University of California and Yale University) that appear in the films without regard for 
whether the uses were placed, authorized, or used without authorization. See ANTREPO4, A2591, 
Movie Posters with Brand Integration, http://a2591.blogspot.com/2008/09/movie-posters-with-
brand-integration.html (Oct. 9, 2008). 
 96. This information is based on a search in Westlaw’s ALLNEWS database for (“product 
placement” or “product integration” or “brand integration”). 
 97. This information is based upon a search in Westlaw’s NYT database conducted on July 
16, 2009 for (“product placement” or “product integration” or “brand integration”). This search 
resulted in 707 articles, all dated 1981 or later. Id. The most recent 383 of these were dated 
November 2003 or later. Id. 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss5/6
2009] RETHINKING THE PARAMETERS OF TRADEMARK USE IN ENTERTAINMENT 1033 
 
under trademark law, but anything more persistent requires permission,”98 
and the Wall Street Journal told its online readers that “[f]ilmmakers must 
sidestep delicate trademark issues when setting a scene. Prominently 
showing an AOL email screen or Google search page, for example, 
requires approval from the companies, so some production designers create 
a variation that avoids the red tape.”99 
In addition, many entertainment products themselves have lampooned 
the practice, bringing it to the forefront of public attention. To name just a 
few: the film Wayne’s World featured a section devoted to product 
placement, in which lead characters Wayne and Garth discussed the moral 
implications of “selling out” while successively presenting to the camera 
products from Pizza Hut, Doritos, Reebok, Nuprin, and Pepsi, eventually 
weaving the products’ mottos in to their dialogue;100 the film Josie and the 
Pussycats blatantly positioned product logos for laughs, like a 6-foot long 
“Advil” logo plastered on the floor below an overhead shot of two young 
women having a fist fight;101 and the characters in the television show 30 
Rock looked into the camera to ask, after singing the praises of Verizon 
phones, “can we have our money now?”102 
The more consumers are aware of the prevalence of product placement, 
the more likely they are to believe that all marks appearing in 
entertainment are placed or licensed.103 As Mark McKenna wrote, “If the 
start time of a baseball game indicates 7-Eleven’s sponsorship [as it has for 
the Chicago White Sox since 2007], is it really possible to say definitively 
that consumers would conclude that the presence of  ‘Microsoft’ in the title 
of an article does not?”104 This belief is bolstered by the practice, 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Sara Lipka, PG-13? Not This College. Or That One. Or…, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., 
June 18, 2009, at A1, A21, available at http://beta.chronicle.com/article/PG-13-Not-This-College-
Or/44494/. 
 99. Andrew Lavallee, Hollywood’s Take on the Internet Often Favors Fun Over Facts, WALL 
ST. J. ONLINE, May 1, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB114417762246516812-
JafduzlqqrJNqD9QzSSA0d3LIk8_20060508.html?mod=blogs. 
 100. WAYNE’S WORLD (Paramount Pictures 1992). 
 101. JOSIE AND THE PUSSYCATS (Universal Pictures, 2001). 
 102. Gail Schiller, “30 Rock” Rolls Ads Into Story Lines, REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/entertainmentNews/idUSN2833828120071128. 
 103. For example, press and consumers alike have expressed confusion over whether the show 
Entourage has received promotional consideration for the many realism-enhancing products used 
on the show. Entertainment Weekly confirmed that the show receives no payment for its use of 
brands, yet the blog Product Placement Watch continues to believe, years later, that the products 
appearing in the show are paid placements. SeeStack, supra note 59, at 18 (Entourage’s love of 
brand names smells fishy. Show creator Doug Ellin says he gets no money for his prominent 
placements of Apple, Barney’s, and Van Cleef & Arpels . . . but “we’ll really get suspicious if 
Vince starts doing iPod commercials.”); Product Placement Watch, 
http://productplacementwatch.blogspot.com/2007/04/entourage-promoting-brands-in-fake-real.html 
(Apr. 9, 2007). 
 104. Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 
823 (2009). 
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especially common in music videos, of digitally pixellating or otherwise 
obscuring marks that are not licensed or placed.105 This pixellation or 
blurring of marks typically occurs when the appearance of the mark does 
not bear on the subject matter of the video. For example, apparel logos are 
frequently blurred in rap videos, but logos designed to make a statement, 
such as the use of a Louis Vuitton logo to indicate luxury in Britney 
Spears’ video for the song Do Somethin’,106 are left in.107 By drawing 
attention to obscured marks, the practice of blurring unlicensed marks 
sends a message to consumers that gratuitous appearances of marks need to 
be licensed.108  
Not only are consumers barraged with evidence of product placement, 
but research also shows that they have come to expect it. In 2005, some 
43% of consumers already believed that the primary purpose of a scene in 
a television show featuring someone using a product was an attempt to 
influence purchase,109 and 65% of magazine readers believed that editorial 
mentions of a brand are the result of a deal between the mark owner and 
the magazine.110 A growing body of marketing and social science literature 
indicates that consumers are aware of, and influenced by, product 
placement.111  
                                                                                                                     
 105. Gibson, supra note 5, at 919 (For example, MTV’s long-form programming policy 
requires blurring of any prominently featured brand that is not part of a product placement deal). 
This practice is motivated in part by a desire to avoid trademark law entanglements, and in part by a 
desire not to provide free advertising to companies that might otherwise pay for placement. 
Interview with John Rogers, creator and executive producer of Leverage (TNT); Interview with 
Alexander Court, assistant to the producer of Greek (ABC Family). Regardless of the reason, the 
practice tends to reinforce consumer assumptions that any brand appearing in entertainment is 
sponsored or approved by the markholder. 
 106. BRITNEY SPEARS, DO SOMETHIN’ (Jive 2005). 
 107. See Amy Odell, Sony To Pay Louis Vuitton for Past Britney, Da Brat Videos, N.Y. MAG., 
Aug. 1, 2008 (discussing settlement of European suit concerning use of Louis Vuitton logo on 
dashboard of fantasy Humvee in Britney Spears’ Do Somethin’ video). 
 108. Gibson, supra note 5, at 917–18 (citing social science research that indicates a strong 
tendency to draw causal inferences from information to which one’s attention is drawn); Newman, 
supra note 6, at 359. 
 109. Dawn Anfuso, Survey Says: TV Ads Not Dead, IMEDIA CONNECTION, Aug. 22, 2005, 
http://www.imediaconnection.com/news/6577.asp (emphasis added). 
 110. The Week, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 17, 2005, at 20. 
 111. DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 72, 85; see also id. at 78 (observing that moviegoers 
in the study “were aware of the persuasive intent of brand props”); id. at 85 (“Our results 
convincingly demonstrate that moviegoers are more sophisticated in their understanding of the 
practice of brand placement than critics would have public policy officials believe.”); Yongjun 
Sung, Federico de Gregorio & Jong-Hyuok Jung, Non-Student Consumer Attitudes Towards 
Product Placement: Implications for Public Policy and Advertisers, 28(2) INT’L J. ADVERTISING 
277 (2009) (discussing study showing that “consumers are very much aware that brands within 
movies are often a form of commercial persuasion, do not see harm in its results, and find benefit in 
the practice’s enhancement of the fictionalized worlds within those films.”); Gibson, supra note 5, 
at 918–19. See generally Sharmistha Law & Kathryn A. Braun-LaTour, Product Placements: How 
to Measure their Impact, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES 
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3.  Permission For Use of Marks 
While some marks that appear in entertainment are placed there in 
exchange for “promotional consideration”—money or goods provided by 
markholders to content creators in exchange for favorable depictions—
other uses involve payment by content creators to markholders in exchange 
for permission to use the marks in the content. Although one involves 
payment by a markholder and the other involves payment to a markholder, 
both product placement and licensing result in a markholder’s exercise of 
control over the use of its mark. Still other uses are unauthorized.112 In 
theory, using a mark without authorization would result in greater artistic 
freedom for a content creator; in practice, however, all content creators 
must be concerned with the repercussions of any trademark uses, and those 
who prefer to use marks without authorization may find themselves 
cramping their own creativity in order to avoid lawsuits.  
To the extent that recent cases involving unauthorized uses of marks 
have reached the courts, most have resulted in findings of non-
infringement.113 Yet, these results have not deterred markholders from 
seeking to restrict artistic uses of their marks. For example, although courts 
have repeatedly stated that “the ‘mere appearance’ of a Ford Taurus in a 
generic film scene involving a car chase would not, by itself, support a 
trademark infringement claim,”114 the producers of the 2008 Knight Rider 
television show have received numerous cease and desist letters from car 
                                                                                                                     
BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT AND PERSUASION 63 (L.J. Shrum ed., 2004) (discussing models and 
studies of consumer persuasion by product placements). Cf. Paul Siegel, Product Placement and the 
Law, HANDBOOK OF PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE MASS MEDIA 89, 97 (Mary-Lou Galician ed., 
2004) (noting that product placements may have been clandestine fifteen years ago but that 
“nowadays, audiences are keenly aware of their existence”). 
 112. Although, as discussed below, the norm trends toward receiving authorization for the use 
of marks as required by most insurance companies, some content creators still use marks without 
authorization. See Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1258 (N.D. 
Cal. 2003) (noting Defendants filed a declaration stating that as a matter of custom, they do not seek 
the permission of manufacturers of name-brand products to use those products in its films, and thus 
did not license the Wham-O “Slip ‘N Slide” nor the other marks used in the film Dickie Roberts: 
Former Child Star (including Wesson Oil, Volkswagen, and Ford)). 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 1262–63 (finding no infringement for use of “Slip ‘N Slide” toy in plot of 
film Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 
919–20 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (finding no infringement for prominent use of Caterpillar mark on 
bulldozers in climactic destruction scene of George of the Jungle 2); Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that use of pinball 
machine in background of film What Women Want was not trademark infringement); see also Rock 
& Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that artist’s use of building image in photograph did not constitute trademark infringement, 
but basing decision on determination that building image did not constitute a protectable trademark. 
This holding supports a claim for infringement when a protectable mark is used in same 
circumstances); McGeveran, supra note 11, at 59 (discussing how “correct outcomes” of recent 
cases have not diminished the continued chilling effect of trademark law on expression). 
 114. Gottlieb, 590 F. Supp. at 635. 
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companies for using their cars in chase scenes against the show’s mythical 
(Ford) car, KITT.115 Cease and desist letters in this context are difficult to 
track, but there can be no doubt that they are both common and chilling.116 
Even a content creator who is likely to prevail in a trademark 
infringement suit has much to fear from litigation. Litigation is costly, and 
even cases that settle prior to adjudication involve significant expense.117 
Moreover, litigation of trademark disputes is frequently fact-intensive and 
involves the additional expense of retaining survey experts to explore 
whether the unauthorized use of a mark caused confusion as to sponsorship 
or endorsement, or whether the unauthorized use is supported by a First 
Amendment defense.118 Survey results and other questions of fact may 
preclude motions to dismiss, or even summary judgment, requiring 
lengthier litigation and increased discovery costs.119 Furthermore, the 
remedy for trademark infringement typically includes injunctive relief, and 
both preliminary and permanent injunctions are common. While injunctive 
relief is an eminently appropriate penalty from a trademark standpoint—
once a use is found to infringe, permitting that use to continue would not 
only perpetuate the harm of infringement but also weaken the plaintiff’s 
mark—content creators may (reasonably) perceive the unauthorized use of 
marks as “not worth the risk.”120  
                                                                                                                     
 115. Gary Scott Thompson, Executive Producer, Knight Rider, Remarks at the Paley Center 
For Media Panel on Branded Entertainment (Oct. 8, 2008), available at 
http://www.paleycenter.org/mc-breakfast-panel-branded-entertainment (“We’ve had cease and 
desists from numerous automotive [companies] because they say that that Ford [KITT] could never 
beat our car in a race . . . It was, seriously, it came from a lawyer. Our car can beat your car so you 
can’t use it.”) [hereinafter Thompson Remarks]. 
 116. The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse database does not track cease and desist letters in this 
particular context, but it is clear from news reports that they occur frequently. Chilling Effects, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). As just one example among many: in 
July 2009, The University of Utah sent a cease and desist letter to the television show Big L veafter 
the show included a three-second shot of a document with the school name and “Big U” logo. Brian 
Maffly & Vince Horiuchi, U. to HBO: Take Our Logo out of ‘Big Love’ Episode, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
July 8, 2009, available at http://www.sltrib.com/tv/ci_12768989. Cease and desist letters may not 
cost the accused infringer as much as a lawsuit does, but they can have a similarly chilling effect on 
conduct, especially since they are easier and cheaper for markholders to send, with fewer 
repercussions. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. &  
LEE L. REV. 585, 589–90 (2008) (discussing chilling effect of cease and desist letters even when a 
case has no merit).  
 117. See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 62–63 (discussing high cost of trademark litigation). 
 118. See, e.g., Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (supporting First 
Amendment defense); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Mattel II, 28 F. Supp. 
2d 1120, 1132–33 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 119. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 813–14 (discussing parties’ extensive discovery 
disputes). 
 120. Gibson, supra note 5, at 913. Injunctive relief is considered necessary to trademark law 
for the same reason that markholders are required to police their marks (or face losing their marks as 
a consequence of failure to police): an infringing mark confuses consumers and weakens the 
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It is natural, then, that content creators and their insurance companies, 
unsure when they can use marks and when they can’t, would choose to 
license marks even when licensing is not necessary or to forego the use of 
marks entirely. A culture of “license, don’t litigate” has arisen in the 
entertainment industry.121 Several commentators have dubbed this 
litigation-avoidance approach the “clearance culture.”122 In an abundance 
of caution, content creators will acquire permission for all uses of 
trademarks (and all uses of copyrighted material), even when there are 
strong defenses to infringement or when the uses are not likely to confuse 
or dilute the value of the mark. Creators and insurers would rather pay to 
use a mark, or avoid its use altogether, than argue that the use is permitted 
without authorization.123  
Lawyers and commentators commonly counsel content creators to 
remove any unauthorized marks, products, or services from their creative 
works.124 This can create significant expense and delay. For example,  
production on a major reality show was delayed when lawyers advised that 
the  plan to film at a Target department store required permission not only 
from Target (which had been obtained), but also from the owners of every 
mark that would appear on shelves in the background.125 Even more 
importantly, insurance companies often require that all trademark uses be 
accounted for, either by product placement or licensing.126 For example, 
insurance carriers commonly require television shows to create episode-by-
episode “clearance reports” detailing what marks are used and stating 
which uses are licensed and which are placed.127 Marks that are not cleared 
                                                                                                                     
original mark. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., AUFDERHEIDE &  JASZI, supra note 10, at 22. Aufderheide and Jaszi define the 
clearance culture as “the shared set of expectations that all rights must always be cleared.” Id. 
 123. AUFDERHEIDE &  JASZI, supra note 10, at 22–23; Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable 
Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1912 (2007) (discussing the 
pervasiveness of clearance culture and its effects on creative products such as biographies and 
documentaries). 
 124. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 19 (“All of this should caution producers to 
think seriously before using branded products in entertainment programming without permission.”); 
Ronald H. Gertz et al., Clearance of Rights for Motion Picture and Television Productions, 
CENTURY CITY BAR ASS’N J., Summer 1983, at 42, 43, 47–50 (recommending clearance of all 
“identifiable names, products, locations, companies [etc.]”). 
 125. Interview with Deborah Henderson, Associate, Irell & Manella LLP, in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 
2008). 
 126. See HEINS &  BECKLES, supra note 12, at 5 (stating errors and omissions insurance carriers 
demand “permission for every snippet of film, photographs, music, or text that is used, in addition 
to shots of distinctive buildings or products,” even when no cause of action would exist). 
 127. Interview with Alexander Court, Assistant to the Producer of Greek, ABC Family, in 
L.A., Cal. (Oct. 2008). These reports are also used by the networks’ advertising sales departments to 
identify markholders who might be amenable to paid product placement deals, and to limit the use 
of non-placed marks. Id. 
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must be removed before an episode airs.128 Content creators comply with 
insurers’ demands out of expediency and fear.129 In addition to the 
clearance of all copyrighted works and the clearance or removal of all 
proper names, most television and film studios’ “standards and practices” 
require the elimination of any references to trademarks in dialogue and the 
removal of or blurring of trademarks that appear on screen.130 Such 
restrictions not only add expense, but may also silence creation altogether. 
For example, the Sony Pictures film Moneyball (which was slated to be 
directed by Stephen Soderbergh and star Brad Pitt) was scrapped in its 
entirety shortly before filming was scheduled to begin, largely because the 
demands of markholder Major League Baseball forced Sony and 
Soderbergh to make unacceptable compromises in the film’s expression.131 
 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id.; see also Thompson Remarks, upra note 115 (“We use products every day, so for us 
on a show, we’re constantly finding storylines where we actually want to use a product and we 
can’t, because there’s no deal in place.”). 
 129. AUFDERHEIDE &  JASZI, supra note 10, at 23 (reporting documentary filmmaker Robert 
Stone’s concern that “[i]f you ever have a claim on E&O insurance . . . you might as well go into 
another line of work. You can never file a claim or you get blacklisted—and never be insured 
again.”). 
 130. See Rothman, supra note 123, at 1922; see also, e.g., MTV Tr3s, Terms and Conditions 
of Participation in the “MTV Tr3s Rock Dinner” Casting Call, 
http://www.mtvtr3s.com/asm/sweeps/rules/rockdinner_castingcallrules_BALA_021309.doc at ¶4 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2009) (barring submissions from containing anything violative of MTV 
Standards and Practices, including “[c]ommercial products (e.g., clothing, toys, food) and/or their 
trademarks, brands, logos or endorsements [and] Unauthorized trademark and copyrighted 
materials”); Comedy Central, Important Things with Demetri Martin: Picture Contest Official 
Rules, http://www.comedycentral.com/shows/important_things/contest_rules/index.jhtml at ¶ 3 (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2009) (barring submissions from containing anything violative of MTV standards 
and practices, including “any commercial endorsements [and] . . . any unauthorized use of a service 
mark, trademark, brand, copyrighted work or any other property, tangible or intangible, or location 
or place or that would otherwise not be considered your original work”). This is likely the origin of 
scenes like the one in an episode of The Office (Reveille Productions 2008), in which the characters 
sat in front of a break-room vending machine with all of its contents flipped around so that only the 
backs of packaging were visible.  
 131. Michael Cieply, Despite A-List Star and Director, a Prestige Film Falls Through, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/business/media/02 
moneyball.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=moneyball&st=cse. In his discussion of the Moneyball 
controversy, William McGeveran succinctly summed up the harm of permitting this level of 
markholder control:  
So, if a screenwriter wants to tell a story about a real team, baseball’s PR 
executives must approve of it first? To the degree that they can change the 
entire style of the movie? What if the character makes a pact with Satan to 
defeat the Yankees? [Damn Yankees] How about an acclaimed Lou Gehrig 
biopic [The Pride of the Yankees], or a cartoon about Babe Ruth’s talking bat 
[Everyone’s Hero]? What about a mock trial of Pete Rose at Harvard Law 
School?  
William McGeveran, Trademarks, Movies, and the Clearance Culture, July 2, 2009, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2009/07/02/tm-movie-clearance/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
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Creators in all media have faced trademark-based restrictions. For 
example, Jennifer Rothman describes the creative choices imposed on 
author Don DeLillo, whose publisher demanded that he change the name 
of his book Panasonic (a reference to consumer culture as well as an 
expression of the cacophonous world inhabited by the book’s protagonist), 
and the makers of the film Camp Out (a documentary about a summer 
camp for gay teens), who were required by studio lawyers to clear the 
trademark rights for every piece of Elvis Presley memorabilia contained in 
the dormitory room of an Elvis-obsessed camper.132 DeLillo and the 
makers of Camp Out would likely have had solid defenses in any suits 
concerning their uses of marks, but as a practical matter, even content 
creators who would prevail in a trademark suit have little choice but to 
license marks or refrain from using them altogether.  
These situations reflect the way in which existing trademark law causes 
content creators to choose between compromising their expression and 
facing increased costs. Creators without the budgets to pay for each 
product and service that appears in a work will be forced to compromise 
their expression. Moreover, existing trademark law imposes creativity 
constraints even on those creators who can afford to clear all marks 
because licensing or placing a mark requires some relinquishing of creative 
control, and some licensing requests are certain to be refused. This is 
particularly likely to occur in the case of parodies or other uses that may 
involve an unfavorable depiction of the mark, product, or service.133 But 
“unfavorable” is in the eye of the beholder, and markholder demands may 
range from inconsequential changes to seeking wholesale revision—
making it impossible for content creators to use real marks in their works 
without adding a layer of (at best, unpredictable, and at worst, crippling) 
censorship. For example, New York University balked at “racy” story lines 
in the television show Felicity,134 forcing its producers to create a fictional 
university for its students (thereby sacrificing realism).135 Whether caused 
by risk aversion, insurance requirements, or markholder demands (or a 
combination of the three), the result is a broad limitation on the storytelling 
                                                                                                                     
 132. See Rothman, supra note 123, at 1903, 1914. 
 133. See HEINS &  BECKLES, supra note 12, at 21. Documentary filmmakers report trademark 
difficulty in depicting real world, and creative choices dictated by trademark concerns. S e id. at 
20–21. For example, one participant commented: 
They’re everywhere. I cut a scene from a film because there was a big cup with 
this gas station trademark on it, but the problem is, you can’t go into a store, 
you can’t buy anything that doesn’t have a logo on it. So they don’t give you 
the option of having a cup with no logo, but I was like, “oh god, I didn’t realize 
that cup had this huge logo in the side of the frame.” 
Id. In this situation, the filmmaker cut the scene, in part because it involved addiction, a subject 
with which the filmmaker feared the markholder would not want to be associated. Id. at 21. 
Similarly, Panasonic denied DeLillo’s request to clear the book title, and the Presley estate could 
easily have refused to license its marks for use in the film Ca p Out in light of the film’s 
controversial subject (or for no reason at all). See Rothman, supra note 123, at 1914. 
 134. Felicity (Touchstone Television 1998). 
 135. Lipka, supra note 98, at A1. 
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and artistic tools available to content creators. James Gibson refers to this 
as the “anticommons”—a subset of potential sources of creative content 
that the law takes out of the public vocabulary.136 
C.  Harmful Results 
Product placement and the culture of “license, don’t litigate” combine 
to create a recursive problem.137 As more marks are placed or licensed and 
fewer marks are used without authorization in favor of conspicuous 
blurring or generic designations, consumers perceive that all uses of marks 
are “bought or paid for.”138 Because the question of trademark 
infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act hinges on consumer 
confusion, this perception essentially creates infringement where none 
existed—to the extent that consumers believe that all uses of marks must 
be authorized by the markholder, any unauthorized use is confusing and 
therefore infringing. This, in turn, increases the need for content creators to 
avoid using unlicensed marks, and hence, the pattern continues.139 
This recursive expansion of trademark rights, which James Gibson dubs 
“rights accretion,” is not a hypothetical problem.140 Although suits 
regarding the use of trademarks in expressive works are not a new 
phenomenon,141 recent years have shown a marked increase in litigation 
over unauthorized uses of marks in entertainment. The Rock and Roll Hall 
of Fame sued photographer Chuck Gentile for including an image of the 
building in a poster.142 Wham-O sued Paramount Pictures for the use of its 
“Slip ‘N Slide” toy in the film Dickie Roberts: Child Star.143 Caterpillar 
sued Walt Disney Company for the use of its mark on bulldozers in the 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Gibson, supra note 5, at 933. 
 137. Gibson, supra note 5, at 913, 934. Gibson discusses this recursive problem as one 
instance of “rights accretion” in U.S. intellectual property law. Id. at 907–28. 
 138. See Anfuso, supra note 109 (reporting 43% of television viewers believe that the primary 
purpose of product appearances in television shows is an attempt to influence purchasing); The 
Week: Mag Readers Assume Advertisers Pay for Plugs, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 17, 2005, at 20 
(reporting 65% of magazine readers believe that product appearances in magazines are placed); cf. 
Gibson, supra note 5, at 924 (“In one 1983 poll, 91.2% of respondents agreed that ‘[n]o product 
can bear the name of an entertainer, cartoon character, or some other famous person unless 
permission is given for its use by the owner of the name or character . . . .’”). 
 139. Gibson, supra note 5, at 907–08; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The 
Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 495–89 (2005) 
(discussing effect of consumer expectations on trademark law). 
 140. See Gibson, supra note 5, at 885–86. 
 141. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
 142. Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 750–51 (6th 
Cir. 1998). 
 143. Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1255 (N.D.Cal. 
2003). 
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film George of the Jungle 2.144 Emerson Electronics sued NBC for 
showing its InSinkErator mark on the television show Heroes.145 Bell 
Helicopter sued Electronic Arts for the use of its HUEY mark and trade 
dress in the video game Battlefield Vietnam.146 The University of Alabama 
sued sports artist Daniel A. Moore for using its distinctive crimson and 
white color scheme in paintings depicting Alabama football games.147 
Louis Vuitton sued Sony BMG in French court over the use of its mark in 
music videos and album covers.148 A pinball machine company sued 
Paramount Pictures for using a pinball machine with the SILVER 
SLUGGER mark visible in the background of the film What Women 
Want.149 The list of suits goes on and on. And although some of these cases 
have ended in losses for the markholder, others remain unresolved or have 
ended in monetary and/or injunctive settlements.150 The lesson is that the 
unauthorized use of a mark in an expressive work is a risky endeavor. 
By increasing the riskiness of unauthorized mark use, these practices 
create a situation in which content creators’ only choices are to refrain 
from using marks or to relinquish creative control to markholders through 
licensing or placement. Regardless of content creators’ ultimate decision, 
the fact of their having to choose creates a number of harmful effects. First, 
it chills expressive speech by limiting the availability of marks as 
expressive tools and limiting content creators’ ability to craft depictions of 
the real world. Second, it conflicts with several policies underlying 
trademark law, including the speech-fostering policy that trademark law 
should not take words, symbols, or colors out of circulation any more than 
necessary, even when leaving terms in circulation may lead to consumer 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 915 (C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 145. Complaint at 3–4, Emerson Elec. Co. v. NBC Universal Television Studios, Inc., 4:06-cv-
01454-TCM (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2006). 
 146. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Original Complaint at 5, Bell H licopter Textron, Inc. v. 
Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 4:06-cv-00841 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2007). 
 147. Adam Liptak, Sports Artist Sued for Mixing Crimson and Tide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2006, at 11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/us/12artist.html?_r=2. 
 148. See Odell, supra note 107 (reporting the settlement of a French suit concerning use of 
Louis Vuitton logo in Britney Spears and Da Brat videos and Rueben Studdard album cover). 
 149. Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 150. Sony BMG agreed to cease distribution of allegedly infringing materials and pay Louis 
Vuitton an undisclosed settlement amount estimated over $300,000 for the use of the LV marks in 
its videos and album covers. Odell, supra note 107. Although the terms of the settlement in the Bell 
Helicopter case were not released, Battlefield Vietnam no longer contains HUEY helicopters, which 
have been replaced by “transport” helicopters. Moreover, a markholder loss in a product placement 
case does not necessarily indicate that a future case on a similar theory would not succeed. See 
Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(holding an artist’s use of a building image in a photograph did not constitute trademark 
infringement, but basing its decision on a determination that building image did not constitute a 
protectable trademark; this holding supports a claim for infringement when a protectable mark is 
used in same circumstances). 
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confusion.151 Third, it increases the transaction costs of content creation, 
which has a disproportionately large speech-chilling effect for small and 
independent content creators. While large entertainment companies, game 
giants, and publishing houses may be able to incur increased production 
costs with relative ease—and may be able to promise larger audiences as 
an incentive for a markholder to authorize the use of a mark—small and 
independent creators are less likely to have the funds or audiences required 
to secure permission to use marks, and thus are more likely to face a choice 
between prohibitive cost and freedom of expressive choice.  
1.  The Loss of Communicative Tools 
The creative restrictions that arise from the “anticommons” are 
significant. First, verisimilitude suffers. A content creator cannot 
practically depict the real world of a given time or place without depicting 
the trademarks and trade dress of that time and place. In the real world, 
consumers are presented with brand names and distinctive trade dress with 
nearly every glance. It is nearly impossible, for example, to present an 
external view of an individual driving a car without showing the car’s 
brand signifiers or distinctive trade dress. Any scene set in a kitchen will 
include brand identifiers (the stove, the refrigerator, the faucets, the food 
packaging, etc.) and urban street scenes are even more brand-heavy, with 
stores, advertisements, and commercial goods in the frame of nearly any 
realistic view, just to name a few.152 In fact, a content creator interested in 
depicting the real world may have no choice but to depict the marks in it, 
not only for reasons of verisimilitude, but also in order to avoid litigation. 
In Sherwood 48 Associates v. Sony Corp. of America,153 the Second Circuit 
implied that the digital alteration of trade dress in a film—removing marks 
from the resulting expressive work—could constitute trademark 
infringement, provided that the marks were part of an articulable and 
distinctive trade dress.154 
Artistically speaking, when a content creator avoids the depiction of 
marks, it sends the message that the image does not represent the real 
world, or is somehow apart from it. Fabricated brands such as “Duff” beer 
and “Morley” cigarettes,155 and brand-free environments such as the entire 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See supra, Part II.A. 
 152. Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films 
into Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 326 (1992) (“If a movie is to accurately depict 
today’s America, it also must depict the commercialization that has seeped into every corner of our 
society.”). 
 153. 76 F. App’x 389 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 154. Id. at 391–92 (dismissing federal trade dress infringement claims on the sole ground that 
the plaintiffs had not sufficiently identified a distinctive trade dress in Times Square, and holding 
that state trademark claims should be dismissed without prejudice to re-pleading). 
 155. The Simpsons (20th Century Fox Television 1989) (“Duff” beer); The X-Files (20th 
Century Fox Television 1993) (“Morley” cigarettes). 
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grocery store filled with generic cans and boxes in the movie Wanted,156 
tell the viewer that the story takes place in an environment different from 
our own, even when they evoke the image of real brands (as the red and 
white Morley boxes evoked Marlboro cigarettes).157 In contrast, viewers’ 
first introduction to the character Cameron Frye in the movie Ferris 
Bueller’s Day Off—a still life of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals arrayed 
next to his bed (Vicks VapoRub, Alka-Seltzer, Bayer, Robitussin)—tells 
viewers instant information about his character.158 Interpreting an 
assortment of generic bottles would have required greater effort on the part 
of the viewer, and could have been misinterpreted as a message that 
Cameron could not afford name-brand cold remedies (a message far from 
the movie’s truth).159 And in some cases—take, for example, the use of a 
Polaroid camera as a memory aid in the film Memento—it would be 
virtually impossible to tell a story without showing brand names or trade 
dress.160 Having to avoid the depiction of real-world products and services 
thus poses a challenge for content creators who wish to depict the real 
world, raising their production costs and making certain angles and scenes 
simply impossible.161 This problem is particularly debilitating for the 
creators of documentaries, whose non-fiction depictions become less real 
with every concession made to the removal of brands.162 
A second creative harm that arises when marks are removed from the 
public vocabulary is the loss of the communicative power of brands as 
cultural icons. Markholders go to great lengths to cultivate brand images 
that go beyond mere source identification, and these brand images have 
become part of our cultural vocabulary.163 Advertising has taught us, for 
                                                                                                                     
 156. WANTED (Universal Pictures 2008). 
 157. See Thompson Remarks, upra note 115 (“If we don’t have an integration with someone, 
that means we have to ‘Greek’ everything. So State Farm Insurance would be you know, ‘Stock 
Farm Insurance’ or some fictitious thing, that for me takes me completely out, or like Budweiser is 
‘Fudweiser.’ And those are the Greeks that go on. And as a viewer, I’m like ‘that’s not even real.’ 
And it takes me out worse than an integration does.”). 
 158. See FERRIS BUELLER’S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures 1986).  
 159. See id. 
 160. MEMENTO (Newmarket Capital Group 2000). 
 161. Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 14 (“To get permission for every fleeting 
mention or appearance of a trademarked item would require production teams to expend enormous 
amounts of additional time and effort. But proceeding without such permission exposes TV and 
filmmakers to potential claims for tarnishment, dilution, unfair competition, product disparagement, 
and false endorsement under the Lanham Act, among others.”). 
 162. See AUFDERHEIDE &  JASZI, supra note 10, at 5 (describing particular trademark challenges 
to documentarians as “[w]hen a trademark appears on a [subject’s] baseball cap . . . rights clearance 
becomes a professional and creative challenge.”). In the last several years, this concept has received 
attention in the copyright field, as documentary filmmakers have struggled with difficult copyright 
fair use decisions regarding what can and cannot be included in their works. The Center for Social 
Media’s Documentary Filmmaker’s Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use addresses these issues. 
Id. at 3. 
 163. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 11, at 397–98; Gibson, supra note 
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example, that Mac people are different from PC people, and that Barbie is 
a paragon (albeit a controversial one) of youthful glamour. We have 
learned, from a combination of publicity and pricing, that products from 
the Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy group are not only expensive leather 
goods, champagnes, and cognacs, but are also associated with wealth, 
luxury, and indulgence. These images have become part of our shared 
national language. Indeed, these brands’ identities transcend national 
borders; Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, for example, have worked around the 
world to cultivate images of universality, ubiquity, and youthful frivolity 
that go well beyond their mere source-identifying functions as purveyors of 
soft drinks and fast food. These brand identities not only help to drive sales 
for markholders, but have powerful expressive capabilities: When Britney 
Spears drives a pink Humvee upholstered in Louis Vuitton through the 
clouds in her Do Somethin’ video, she conveys an image not only of 
fantasy but also of luxury;164 and the Coca-Cola bottle that falls from the 
sky into an aboriginal village in The Gods Must Be Crazy serves as an 
engine for the film not only because it is a symbol of the world outside the 
village, but also because the impact of this bottle’s intrusion into aboriginal 
life contrasts with Coca-Cola’s brand images.165 
2.  Conflicts with Trademark Policy 
To the extent that concerns over trademark liability result in a 
constriction of the creative vocabulary of expressive works, this effect 
stands in direct opposition to a number of the policies underlying 
trademark law. In creating the current tapestry of trademark protection, 
Congress and the courts have taken pains to ensure that trademark law does 
not remove words or symbols from circulation any more than absolutely 
necessary to prevent consumer confusion and, on some occasions, to 
protect the breadth of the American vocabulary even when such protection 
would lead to consumer confusion.166 For example, descriptive words and 
                                                                                                                     
5, at 933 (“Numerous commentators have observed that trademarks frequently assume a role in 
popular rhetoric that has little to do with the cost-lowering, source-identifying function for which 
the law provides protection.”); Kozinski, supra note 11, at 454–58 (observing the expressive 
capability of marks: “Some ideas—‘it’s the Rolls-Royce of its class,’ for example—are difficult to 
express any other way”); Litman, supra note 11, at 1730 (noting value in brand identity that 
transcends source identification); Newman, supra note 6, at 357–59 (discussing the cultural value 
of trademarks). 
 164. SPEARS, supra note 106. 
 165. THE GODS MUST BE CRAZY (Cat Films 1980). The film also prominently features a highly 
unreliable Land Rover vehicle—an unflattering portrayal of the automotive brand that contrasts 
with Land Rover’s brand message of adventure, excitement, and the ability to handle hostile 
conditions—and a use that, I speculate, would not have survived if the filmmakers had needed Land 
Rover’s permission to use the vehicle mark. Id. 
 166. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 11 (discussing trademark law’s doctrinal support of 
free speech and expression). 
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surnames cannot be protected as trademarks unless they have developed 
secondary meaning as source identifiers of a particular good or service—
and even then, descriptive words may still be used in a descriptive 
manner.167 This doctrine, known as classic trademark fair use, permits the 
use of descriptive terms in a descriptive manner even when such use is 
likely to create a likelihood of confusion.168 Along the same lines, the 
doctrine of nominative fair use permits the use of a trademark to refer to a 
product or service when: (1) the product or service in question is not 
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) no more of the mark 
or marks is used than reasonably necessary to identify the product or 
service; and (3) the user does nothing that would, in conjunction with the 
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.169 
Although confusion may arise from permitted nominative uses, it is more 
important that people be able to make reference to marks in expressing 
themselves than it is for the Lanham Act to eradicate all potential 
confusion regarding sponsorship.170 Cases that restrict the use of marks in 
entertainment risk running afoul of these policies.  
Trademark law’s prohibition on the protection of generic terms ensures 
that the law does not lock away the basic tools of communication, and the 
law’s fair use provisions recognize that it may be impossible to express 
oneself without using marks. As discussed above, certain things—instant 
cameras and automobiles, for example—simply cannot be depicted easily 
without incidentally showing at least part of a distinctive trademark or 
trade dress.171 Yet—in conflict with the policies underlying the law—
litigation may arise even from uses for which digital alteration is virtually 
the only alternative to showing a brand name. This was the case in 
                                                                                                                     
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). 
 168. See KP Permanent Makeup, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121–22 
(2004) (“Some possibility of consumer confusion is compatible with fair use . . . . The common 
law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of consumers followed from the very 
fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not 
to mention the undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a 
descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.”) (citation omitted). 
 169. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 170. The nominative fair use specifically examines whether the defendant did anything beyo d
the use of the mark that would imply sponsorship or endorsement. See id.Thus, while mere use of 
the mark may be confusing, the test tolerates such potential confusion in the absence of evidence 
that the defendant’s actions, in conjunction with the use of the mark, implied sponsorship or 
endorsement. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that Franklin Mint’s statements regarding the “authenticity” of its Princess Diana themed 
product, and statements that proceeds from sales would be donated to “Diana, Princess of Wales’ 
Charities” did not imply sponsorship or endorsement for purposes of nominative fair use). 
 171. See, e.g., Gary Thompson Remarks, supra note 115 (responding to those who criticized 
his acceptance of product placement for the car KITT in the 2008 Knight Rider by explaining: “It’s 
a show about a car. I need a car. . . . the Camaro went to Transformers (the movie) and they’re not 
going to let us have it, what car do you want me to use? I mean, it’s a show about a talking car.”). 
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Emerson Electronics Co. v. NBC Universal Television Studios Inc.,172 in 
which the maker of the “InSinkErator” in-sink disposal sued the producers 
of the television show Heroes regarding a scene in which a cheerleader 
with powers of invincibility mangles her hand in an in-sink disposal unit 
(with the “InSinkErator” brand name visible), only to have the hand heal 
itself a moment later.173  
Suits like the Emerson Electronics case seem to be founded on the 
erroneous premise that a trademark conveys a property right subject to 
trespass, and that such trespass occurs when someone other than the 
markholder displays the mark without the consent of the markholder. This, 
in essence, would create a secondary market in the display of a mark 
divorced from its underlying product or service—a market that does not 
and cannot exist. Such a secondary market defeats the basic premise that 
trademarks exist to identify the source of goods and services, and do not 
convey rights in gross.174 Trademark law reflects this tenet in several areas, 
including the rule that a mark is abandoned if it is assigned “in gross,” that 
is, without the right to produce or provide the good or service underlying 
the mark.175  
While trademarks may be valuable assets, they do not provide real-
property-type exclusive rights in the style of copyright and patent, for good 
reason. Because trademarks exist primarily to convey information about 
products and services, many unauthorized uses do not detract from the 
purpose of trademark.176 Consumers receive information about products 
and services from myriad sources, many of which are not controlled by 
markholders—word of mouth, news, entertainment—and each of those 
sources contributes to the richness of brand identity. Personal experience 
watching a friend’s children enjoy Cheerios cereal contributes to its brand 
identity, as do news reports about the cereal’s health benefits, as does a 
movie scene in which characters chow down on Cheerios as part of a 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Emerson Elec. Co. v. NBC Universal Television Studios, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 01454 (E.D. 
Mo. 2006). The case settled in February, 2007, after four months of litigation. NBC ultimately 
agreed to remove the “InSinkErator” brand from future airings of the program. Falkenberg & 
McNamara, supra note 80. A less wealthy producer would not necessarily have had the resources 
required to meet such demands. 
 173. Heroes (NBC Universal Television 2006); Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 1. 
 174. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (stating a trademark 
is not a “right in gross” and “[t]he owner of a trade-mark may not, like the proprietor of a patented 
invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly”). 
 175. See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
§ 18:2–:3 (4th ed. 2006). 
 176. Jessica Litman makes a similar point in Breakfast with Batman: to the extent that brand 
identity transcends source identification, that brand identity is not the exclusive property of the 
markholder. “While there is nothing wrong with encouraging [a markholder] to sell the public on 
atmospherics and to devise clever ways to exploit those atmospherics commercially, neither 
incentive theory nor moral desert offers a reason to protect them from competition.” Litman, supra 
note 11, at 1734–35. 
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suburban breakfast. General Mills (the owner of the Cheerios mark) may 
control none of these uses that nonetheless strengthen, rather than weaken, 
the Cheerios mark. If these obvious and universal uses were prohibited by 
trademark law (or were only permitted with permission of General Mills), 
they likely would not occur: families would refrain from eating cereal in 
public, news reports would be cut, and—as discussed above—branded 
props would disappear. Moreover, if General Mills had a display right in 
its mark, it would have to enforce that right in order to maintain its mark. 
This is true not only because the current system prevents “naked licensing” 
(that is, permitting others to use one’s mark without exercising control 
over the goods and services associated with the mark),177 but also because 
of the recursive problem identified above—if consumers know that a 
markholder has the ability to control every imaginable use of its mark, 
consumers will believe that all such uses are controlled, and will be 
confused by unauthorized uses.178 Thus, a system that creates a “display 
right” in marks prevents rich brand identities from forming. And depriving 
marks of the opportunity to grow such meaning reduces their value to 
consumers as source identifiers, thereby subverting the purpose of 
trademark law.179  
And yet even if the law permitted a display right in trademarks, it would 
still result in a Catch-22 for content creators. In cases in which it is 
impossible to depict something without depicting marks—such as the 
Emerson case, or a depiction of Times Square (which necessarily depicts 
the many advertisements that festoon its buildings)—content creators may 
face suits for trademark infringement if they elect to remove the marks 
digitally. In Sherwood 48 Associates v. Sony Corp. of America,180 the 
owners of Times Square billboards sued the creators of the film Spider-
Man for trade dress infringement when the film contained digitally 
replaced images of the billboards.181 The Second Circuit dismissed the 
federal trade dress claim—but only on the basis that the plaintiff had not 
adequately described a distinctive trade dress in Times Square.182 Th  court 
held open the possibility of both federal and state trademark claims for 
                                                                                                                     
 177. “Naked licensing” doctrine has the potential to create a sort of Catch-22 for markholders 
as well as content creators. To the extent that the law did require permission for every use of a mark 
in an expressive content, it could create an impossible policing burden for markholders. The irony 
of achieving ultimate protection would be that markholders could be perceived as abandoning their 
marks if they did not seek to stop all unauthorized uses—an unlikely outcome, but nonetheless an 
immense burden that most markholders would likely find intolerable. Se  3 MCCARTHY, supra note 
175, § 18:48. 
 178. See supra Part II.C. 
 179. Gulasekaram, supra note 6, at 908–10. 
 180. 76 F. App’x 389 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 181. Id. at 390. 
 182. Id. at 391. 
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digital alteration of distinctive trade dress.183 In addition, a content creator 
who attempts to avoid liability by using a faux mark that may call to mind 
a genuine mark but is distinct from it—a practice well-accepted in the field 
of “house brands”—may face liability as well. In E.S.S. Entertainment 
2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.,184 the court held that the creators of 
the video game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas were precluded from 
relying on the defense of nominative fair use when the owners of the “Play 
Pen” strip club objected to the game’s use of the name “Pig Pen” to 
identify an in-game strip club.185 The combination of Emerson with the 
Sherwood 48 and E.S.S. cases puts content creators in an untenable 
position—they must either license marks (which may not be possible in 
light of creators’ limited resources or creative restrictions that markholders 
may place on licensed uses) or avoid marks entirely (which not only 
sacrifices verisimilitude but may make some creative expressions 
impossible). Should the broadcaster of a sports game be required to clear 
all of the visible marks on clothes worn by the crowd? Absurd—yet under 
these cases, a possible outcome. 
3.  The Chill of Increased Transaction Costs and Markholder 
Control 
It is true that some content creators who wish to express verisimilitude, 
location, or characterization through the use of marks are free to license the 
use of those marks. If one markholder refuses to provide a license, other 
comparable marks may be available for licensing. Yet, the problems 
created by the lack of clarity in the law are not prone to self-repair through 
market forces. The current legal climate of risk aversion, insurance 
restrictions, and widespread consumer assumptions about product 
placement does not strike a balance between speech and mark protection. 
Instead, every use of a mark in entertainment must be either placed or 
licensed.  
These constraints, even if taken to the extreme, do not eliminate the 
ability of content creators to communicate using marks, but they do 
provide markholders with nearly unlimited control over the use of marks in 
entertainment. This does not necessarily benefit consumers. As Wendy 
Gordon has noted, it does not benefit society to require permission for the 
use of marks unless we assume that the markholder’s interests are aligned 
with society’s.186 These interests may be aligned in the case of neutral and 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 391–92. 
 184. 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 185. Id. at 1098–99. Ultimately, the court found no infringement, on other grounds. Id. at 
1099–1101. 
 186. Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodification and 
Market Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 149 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil 
Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002); see also Rothman, supra note 123, at 1949 (“Trademark 
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positive depictions of marks; it is almost certainly not true in the case of 
negative depictions of marks, for which markholders stand like foxes 
guarding the henhouse of free expression. Moreover, regardless of the 
actual likelihood of litigation, fear of litigation and ambiguity in the law 
have forced content creators to become more and more constrained in all of 
their depictions of marks (positive, neutral, and negative), even when they 
may believe that such uses are unlikely to be infringing or dilutive. By 
definition, this stifles expression well beyond the trade-off necessary to 
prevent consumer confusion. The scuttled production of the film 
Moneyball is but one example among many.187 Even beyond speech 
ramifications, this process—receiving clearance for some marks, and 
working around or blurring others—inherently increases the transaction 
costs involved in making a creative product. As this increased cost 
discourages content creators who are unwilling or unable to incur the 
additional (financial and artistic) costs imposed by trademark restriction, 
the restrictions ultimately (and ironically) harm content consumers—those 
whom the trademark laws were originally designed to benefit.188  
When markholders hold the reins of trademark use in entertainment, 
they gain control over content by maintaining control over the context in 
which their marks appear. Few, if any, markholders are willing to license 
(or place) their marks for use in a creative setting without some ability to 
approve or disapprove of such uses.189 When marks are placed or licensed, 
markholders maintain (and are likely to exercise) the ability to eliminate 
negative depictions of their products and services.190 The clearance process 
                                                                                                                     
protection . . . must consider the protection of businesses’ goodwill and the prevention of consumer 
confusion, as well as the need for both consumers and competitors to refer to others’ 
trademarks. . . . How exactly one would divide up these rights is a matter of much debate, but most 
people would agree that an optimal allocation of IP rights requires consideration of these sometimes 
competing interests.”). 
 187. See Cieply, supra note 131. 
 188. Gibson, supra note 5, at 932–34 (“When filmmakers, writers, and other artists avoid using 
some of our most meaningful cultural referents for fear of being sued, culture suffers.”). 
 189. Attorneys are counseling their clients to treat product placements and cleared uses just as 
regular commercials and to exercise maximum content control over those uses. See, e.g., James H. 
Johnson, Weathering the Perfect Storm: Product Placement and Intellectual Property, 20 LEGAL 
BACKGROUNDER 56, Nov. 18, 2005, at 3; Glen M. Zatz, Lease, Camera, Action!, 36 MICH. REAL 
PROP. REV. 26, 28 (Spring 2009) (“[U]nless you can be comfortable as to the theme of the movie 
and as to how your company name will be portrayed, you risk damage to your image.”). Indeed, one 
might even argue that failure to do so would constitute “naked licensing,” a form of mark 
abandonment that occurs when a markholder licenses its mark for use without exercising some 
degree of oversight or quality control over the product or service to be associated with the mark. 
See, e.g., Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 596–97 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding naked licensing resulted in abandonment of the licensor’s mark when the licensor failed to 
exercise quality control over the licensee). 
 190. Creative control is a factor for both paid placements and unpaid authorized uses. See 1 
Jay Kenoff & Richard K. Rosenberg, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS 18–37 (Donald C. 
Farber ed., 2002) (noting approval rights are negotiated among parties; suppliers seek approval over 
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thus places important storytelling tools off-limits. If all uses of marks 
require markholder approval, what does the villain drive?191 Would the TV 
show 24 be barred from its frequent practice of distinguishing “good guys” 
from “bad guys” by making the good guys use Mac computers and the bad 
guys use PCs?192  
Under the current system, content creators not only lose control over 
their productions, but also must pay more to create them.  The transaction 
costs involved with obtaining permission to use marks mean that the 
chilling effects of the current system are felt disproportionately by small 
and independent content creators, who may lack not only the resources to 
license marks, but also the market penetration to secure product placement 
benefits. A stunning irony results: risk-averse content creators will avoid 
using marks in positive or neutral contexts, but may feel more comfortable 
                                                                                                                     
the manner in which their products are depicted, and “[t]he larger the fee paid by the supplier, the 
more important it will be for the supplier to have some form of approval over the use of the 
product”); Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, at 14 (discussing unpaid authorized uses and 
stating, “Where products are featured in a flattering or neutral manner, owners of the products 
typically approve of the use. Manufacturers will sign a release approving of the use so long as the 
product is not shown in a disparaging manner”); Johnson, supra note 189, at 3 (“The custodians of 
a brand are not just responsible for protecting the brand from infringement, but the image of the 
brand as well. Therefore, brand owners should make sure that they understand the context in which 
their brands or other intellectual property are going to appear. The intellectual property owner 
should retain the right to review and approve the final version of the use of the intellectual property 
as well as the use in advertising. He or she should treat the product placement as he would a more 
traditional advertisement by establishing internal procedures and policies to make sure that no 
consent or placement occurs that would damage the image of the brand.”); Lewis, supra note 80, at 
10 (“The more the industry shifts from free product placement to payment for branded integration, 
the greater the pressure for producers to defer their creative control in favor of advertiser 
demands.”); Lipka, supra note 98, at A21 (stating universities restrict depictions of fictional alumni: 
“no diplomas or sweatshirts unless a character will do his alma mater proud”); Shagin & Savare, 
supra note 7, at 35 (noting that in determining whether to place products, product placement 
agencies consider, among other things, the degree to which content creators are amenable to 
creative changes); see also Presentation by Tom Meyer, President of Davey- Brown Entertainment 
[a product placement agency], at the Paley Center for Media, October 8, 2009 (“You get your brand 
manager talking directly to a creative [e.g., a writer], and . . . even if they get along in the first 
meeting, by the time you get to being done, there’s probably been a knock-down drag ‘em 
out . . . .”). When products are placed, markholders have, on occasion, required rewrites or re-
shoots to improve the visibility of their products. Robert Adler, Here’s Smoking at You, Kid: Has 
Tobacco Placement in the Movies Really Stopped?, 60 MONT. L. REV. 243, 247 (1999). A content 
creator’s unwillingness to make such creative concessions may result in contract litigation. See 
Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Tristar Pictures, Inc., Civ. No. 96-8982 SVW (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 23, 1996) 
(concerning the removal of a scene featuring Reebok shoes from the film J rry Maguire). 
 191. See Thompson Remarks, supra note 115 (“Because Ford sponsors the car, other 
automotive places will not allow us to use their vehicles in chases or bad guys or anything like that; 
so it sort of becomes problematic because then Ford also doesn’t want bad guys driving their 
product either.”). 
 192. 24 (Imagine Entertainment 2001); Bryan Chaffin, Mac Sightings: Fox’s ‘24’ Sports 
Massive Mac Presence, MAC OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 2001, http://www.macobserver.com/article/20 
01/11/07.5.shtml. 
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using harmful depictions without authorization, as long as these depictions 
(however destructive they may be) are not likely to be “confusing” to 
consumers.  
These harms are also not prone to self-reversal through altered 
behavior. The expansion of trademark rights may be exacerbated by the 
tendency of content creators to license and/or blur marks even when it is 
unnecessary to do so. However, for several reasons, the cessation of such 
behavior is unlikely to result in a system in which trademark law accurately 
tracks harm. First, there is little to encourage content creators to refrain 
from seeking permission to use marks, especially when insurance carriers 
frequently insist upon such permissions. Second, there is little to encourage 
markholders to permit the unlicensed use of marks, because even 
markholders are likely to prefer having control over content, even if the 
alternative is a positive uncontrolled depiction. Third, to the extent that 
content creators do elect to use unauthorized marks, they are likely to do so 
in the safest possible circumstances from a litigation standpoint, such as 
when the mark is presented unobtrusively, neutrally, or positively. Because 
these benign uses are less likely to result in litigation, they are less likely to 
result in a clarification of the rules for other content creators. At the same 
time, however, to the extent the uses are neutral or positive, there is a 
chance they may reinforce consumers’ assumptions that every use of a 
mark is a product placement.  
In addition to stifling speech, a climate that denies content creators the 
option of using marks without authorization may also under-serve 
markholders to some degree, since content creators may elect to forego 
using a mark rather than licensing it or providing an opportunity for 
placement. Because the law is unclear,193 content creators are faced with 
the identical binary decision for each desired mark. If the law were clear 
that some uses needed to be licensed and others didn’t, content creators 
with limited resources would be able to use the marks that did not require 
authorization. This would leave them with more resources to devote to 
licensing or negotiating for placement of those marks whose uses would be 
infringing if used without authorization.  
III.   CRAFTING A SYSTEM 
To address the harms discussed in section II, an ideal system for 
regulating trademark use in entertainment would maximize trademark  
value without sacrificing an ounce of free expression. But no system can 
demand absolute perfection. A certain degree of restriction on speech is to 
be expected with any intellectual property law. Chilled expression is a 
trade-off we make in exchange for the benefits of copyright, patent, and 
trademark protection. Ideally, however, intellectual property laws are 
                                                                                                                     
 193. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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formulated and implemented in a way that balances as large an intellectual 
property benefit as possible against as small a speech-chilling effect as 
possible.  
The current system is far from ideal. It chills speech through a 
symbiotic relationship between content creators’ risk aversion and the 
expansion of trademark rights. This is fueled by the law’s dependence on 
consumers’ increasing awareness of product placement and marketing 
practice, and exacerbated by legal ambiguity. Thus, the law (in cooperation 
with content creators’ own actions and consumers’ growing knowledge), 
has served to prevent unauthorized trademark uses far beyond the level that 
would be required to prevent trademark harm. This clearly disserves 
content creators, whose hands are tied creatively. Beyond that, however, it 
also fails at the goal of maximizing trademark value: risk-averse content 
creators deny markholders the brand exposure of potentially-beneficial 
unauthorized uses, and markholders still face the possibility that 
unauthorized uses that do not confuse consumers may still be permitted to 
tarnish marks with impunity. 
Ideally, a trademark system would avoid these ills. It would prevent 
trademark harm without precluding or discouraging potentially beneficial 
uses; it would be clear enough to minimize risk aversion; it would take into 
account consumers’ awareness of product placement and mark licensing to 
the extent they were relevant to trademark harm, without allowing that 
awareness to dictate the scope of the law; and it would be mindful of free 
speech concerns. But why does the current system—which was built with 
many of these concerns in mind—fall so short of achieving these goals? 
A.  Why Doesn’t the Current System Work? 
1.  Missing the Target 
At its core, trademark law exists not to prevent consumer confusion in 
and of itself, but to prevent the harm that results from that confusion. This 
includes harm to consumers through passing off and the loss of brand 
reliability as well as harm to markholders through loss of goodwill, brand 
identity, and ultimately, sales. For the most part, consumer confusion is an 
adequate proxy for these harms because these harms stem from consumer 
confusion. But consumer confusion may not map perfectly to consumer or 
markholder harm. The mere fact that confusion is likely to occur in a given 
circumstance does not necessarily mean that such confusion is inherently 
harmful to consumers or markholders. In fact, the same factors that have 
led to an increase in product placement (and with it, an increase in the 
potential for consumer confusion) also mean that some types of 
unauthorized uses are likely to benefit markholders rather than harm them.  
Thus, in analyzing the degree to which current trademark law succeeds 
at minimizing trademark harm, we should ask two questions: (1) Is the 
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current likelihood of confusion formulation effective at identifying 
circumstances under which consumers are most likely to be confused; and 
(2) are the current formulations of likelihood of confusion and dilution 
laws effective at identifying circumstances in which consumers and 
markholders are most likely to be harmed? 
In response to the first question, in theory, any time a mark is used 
without authorization, consumers could conceivably be confused into 
believing that the markholder sponsored and/or approved of the underlying 
work, or that there is an affiliation between the mark and the content 
creator. In most cases, the likelihood of such confusion is slight. The 
likelihood of confusion grows, however, through a vicious cycle. As 
consumers become increasingly aware of the prevalence of product 
placement, content creators become increasingly hesitant to show 
unauthorized marks without blurring or otherwise obscuring them, and 
consumers correspondingly begin to assume that all mark appearances are 
the result of product placement. 
In practice, the degree of likelihood of confusion stemming from any 
unauthorized use may depend on the specific use. For the most part, recent 
cases dealing with unauthorized mark uses have concerned negative 
depictions of marks. These cases have held that such depictions are 
unlikely to be confusing because consumers are less likely to believe that 
the appearance of a mark is sponsored or approved by a markholder if the 
mark is depicted in such a way that the markholder would not approve.194 
Outside the courtroom, however, even negative depictions may give rise to 
confusion, particularly as marketing strategies broaden in a world of 
advertising saturation. In recent years, markholders have increasingly 
adopted the philosophy that any attention is good attention, and have 
publicized their brands in ways that some might consider “tarnishing.”195 
Examples include New York City’s licensing of its subway logos for use 
on condoms, and dual-licensed “rivalry figurines” that show one school’s 
mascot being humiliated by another.196 Absolut Vodka has also placed its 
mark in expressive works that some might find objectionable, such as the 
product’s appearance as the sole item protecting a male model’s modesty 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1077 
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Where the use of the mark is in an unflattering context or a setting which would 
be disadvantageous to the mark’s holder, it would seem customer confusion as to endorsement or 
affiliation is particularly unlikely.” (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc. v. Loompanics Enters., 
Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1232, 1242 (D. Md. 1996))); Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality 
Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“[R]ational analysis of the situation 
does not indicate a likelihood that the public will believe that the Girl Scouts are the authors of the 
poster to which they understandably take such violent exception.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits 
on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352, 352 (2007), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/25/tushnet.html. 
 196. See id. (discussing condom and rivalry-mascot licensing). 
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on the show Sex and the City.197 If consumers are aware of the growing 
prevalence of such controversial advertisements and placements—and even 
if they are not—consumers may assume that the markholder was willing to 
sponsor or approve of a use that demeans the mark. This, in turn, could 
harm consumers’ attitudes toward the brand or the markholder. In addition, 
even if consumers are not confused, unauthorized negative uses could lead 
to tarnishment, if consumers adopt a negative association with a mark by 
virtue of its depiction.198 As discussed below, however, dilution law is 
unlikely to put a stop to such tarnishment.199 
Fewer cases have addressed the question of how the traditional 
likelihood of confusion test treats unauthorized positive or neutral 
depictions of marks. This is understandable; markholders are less likely to 
object to positive and neutral depictions with the fervor required to justify 
litigation, and thus disputes over such uses are less likely to become public. 
When litigation has arisen, it has provided little aid in solidifying the 
current doctrine’s approach to likelihood of confusion. Although at least 
one court has expressed skepticism in dicta regarding the likelihood of 
confusion that could arise from a simple positive or neutral unauthorized 
use,200 courts have not ratified that view in binding precedent. The Gottlieb 
case, regarding the use of a pinball machine in the background of the film 
What Women Want,201 was decided on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
allege facts supporting a claim of confusion.202 And Bell Helicopter’s suit 
against Electronic Arts regarding its (at worst, neutral, but generally 
positive) depiction of Huey helicopters in the game Battlefield Vietnam 
settled out of court before reaching the dispositive motion stage.203 In the 
absence of court guidance, markholders have pressed content creators to 
avoid even neutral or favorable unauthorized uses, and risk-averse content 
creators, fueled in part by insurance concerns, have become wary of using 
                                                                                                                     
 197. Sex and the City (Home Box Office July 27, 2003). 
 198. In essence, this was the holding in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema, Ltd., in which the creators of the pornographic film Debbie Does Dallas costumed their 
characters in uniforms that were confusingly similar to those worn by the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders. 604 F.2d 200, 202–03 (2d Cir. 1979). The Second Circuit granted preliminary 
injunction because viewers were likely to believe that the Dallas Cowboys had sponsored or 
approved the film; however, the court’s reasoning rang in the language of tarnishment: “[I]t is hard 
to believe that anyone who had seen defendants’ sexually depraved film could ever thereafter 
disassociate it from plaintiff’s cheerleaders.” Id. at 205. 
 199. See infra notes 200–15 and accompanying text. 
 200. Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 634–36 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (expressing, in dicta, skepticism that the unauthorized use of a branded car in a car chase 
would give rise to a successful claim for likelihood of confusion (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt 
Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919–20 (C.D. Ill. 2003))). 
 201. WHAT WOMEN WANT (Paramount Pictures 2000). 
 202. Gottlieb, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 636. 
 203. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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marks without authorization even in neutral or favorable contexts.204 
On its face, this would appear to show that the current system is 
ineffective at identifying circumstances in which trademark harm is most 
likely to occur. Courts are unlikely to find confusion when a mark is 
depicted negatively, even though negative depictions seem more likely to 
harm a mark’s image and even though such confusion is increasingly likely 
to occur. Courts are more likely to find confusion when a mark is depicted 
positively; however, risk aversion pressure will prevent such uses, even 
though such uses may be innocuous or even beneficial to trademark value. 
Thus, while the current likelihood of confusion formulation may frequently 
“get it right” in terms of identifying consumer confusion, it may not be as 
good at identifying trademark harm. 
But it is not that simple. Just as likelihood of confusion is not 
necessarily determinative of trademark harm, negativity of depiction is not 
either. In fact, a growing body of social science research tends to indicate 
that trademark benefit or harm is more likely to be tied to the degree to 
which the use of the mark is artistically relevant than to whether the use is 
positive or negative.  
In general, studies show that consumers react positively to the inclusion 
of brands in entertainment. Brands add realism and aid in characterization 
and context, making stories more relatable.205 Consumers generally react 
far less favorably, however, to uses that are made without any legitimate 
artistic purpose. Consumers often believe that gratuitous uses are 
sponsored by the markholder, and even more commonly tend to retain 
negative associations with a mark that is used without artistic 
justification.206 Social science literature has documented this phenomenon, 
mostly in the context of film and television. For example, one study found 
that moviegoers expressed a strong dislike for brand props that “clashed 
with their expectations of movie scenery.”207 Respondents associated 
gratuitous brand uses with “promotion intent” and found that techniques 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See supra Part II.B.3.  
 205. See, e.g., DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 71, 77, 79 (describing study participants’ 
overall favorable reaction to the use of branded props: “To informants in both studies, brand props 
were significant because they add realism to the stylistic aspects of movie scenery.” Participants’ 
statements included the following: “they help to preserve the integrity of a movie with regard to 
realism and projecting yourself into that movie”; “it lends an air of reality to it . . . an air of 
authenticity.” According to the study, “Brand props were judged to add authenticity to movies when 
associated with a particular setting, time period, or context.” Study participants also observed a 
powerful ability of branded props to convey “relevant information about the character’s personality, 
lifestyle, and role in the movie plot.”); Nelson, supra note 75, at 80, 85–87 (reporting video game 
players were generally positive toward product placement and believed it added to game realism); 
Sung et al., supra note 111, at 273 (“[R]espondents tend to agree that brand appearances make the 
world within the film more realistic [and they] . . . have positive perceptions of product placement 
realism.”). 
 206. See DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78. 
 207. DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78. 
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such as “constant repetition of a brand, brands placed in inappropriate 
settings (i.e., the brand ‘didn’t need to be there,’ was ‘unexpected,’ and 
‘not natural’), and inappropriate camera techniques (i.e., ‘zeroed in,’ 
‘closeups on the name,’ and ‘camera sort of locks on it’) . . . detracted from 
movie realism.”208 In addition, a number of studies discuss the effect of 
“incongruence”: when the appearance of a product is not “highly connected 
to the plot,” the incongruence of the brand’s appearance will prompt 
viewers to question the brand’s presence in the show and to assume that 
the brand’s presence is a sponsored or approved attempt to advertise.209 
This “persuasion knowledge” adversely impacts viewers’ attitudes about 
the brand.210 The same is true for video games.211 Thus, when a mark is 
                                                                                                                     
 208. DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78. 
 209. See, e.g., Balasubramanian et al., supra note 84, at 115, 128 (discussing congruence 
studies); Karrh et al., supra note 70, at 140 (discussing studies in which placements were received 
more favorably when they were “congruen[t] with scenery” and “related to program content”); 
Cristel Antonia Russell, Investigating the Effectiveness of Product Placements in Television Shows: 
The Role of Modality and Plot Connection Congruence on Brand Memory and Attitude, 29 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 306, 308–09 (2002) (noting viewers are distracted by the use of a brand when “the 
mention of the brand in the dialogue is not justified by the story (lower plot audio) or when a visual 
brand becomes an obvious focus of the story when it should serve an accessory role (higher plot 
visual).”); Mei-Ling Wei et al., An Examination of the Effects of Activating Persuasion Knowledge 
on Consumer Response to Brands Engaging in Covert Marketing, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y &  MARKETING 
34, 34 (2008) (“In general, product placements are believed to be most effective when brands meld 
seamlessly with the elements in which they are embedded.” (citation omitted)). Even in advertising, 
research shows that “commercial watching increases with entertainment content and decreases with 
information content.” Wilbur et al., supra note 79, at 3. 
 210. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cowley & Chris Barron, When Product Placement Goes Wrong, 37 J. 
ADVERTISING, Spring 2008, at 89–90, 96 (discussing studies linking persuasion knowledge with 
negative brand attitude: “Specifically, if the placement is pulled from the background where it 
merely creates a context from which drama or humor emerges, to the foreground where the humor is 
created as a vehicle to highlight the product, then prominent placements may interrupt the viewers’ 
‘suspension of disbelief.’ At this point, the persuasive intent interrupts the editorial content, which 
may cause irritation.” Test subjects who liked the program were more likely to recognize brand 
placements and to report lower brand attitudes in response. Test subjects who did not recognize 
brand placements as such were more likely to report higher brand attitudes in response.); Alain 
d’Astous & Francis Chartier, A Study of Factors Affecting Consumer Evaluations and Memory of 
Product Placements in Movies, J. CURRENT ISSUES &  RES. IN ADVERTISING, Fall 2000, at 31, 38 
(“[T]he degree of integration of a placement within a movie scene has a positive impact on 
consumer liking . . . [and] well integrated placements are significantly less likely to be perceived as 
unacceptable[.]”); DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78; Wiles & Danielova, supra note 74, at 
57–58 (reporting the results of a study supporting “pernicious effects of placement blatancy” and 
“suggest[ing] that the worth of film product placement could depend on the match of the product, 
the film, and the film’s audience”); see generally Eva Van Reijmersdal, Brand Placement 
Prominence: Good for Memory! Bad for Attitudes?, 49 J. ADVERTISING RES. 151, 151–52 (2009) 
(reviewing studies on prominence, congruence, and persuasion knowledge). 
 211. Nelson, supra note 75 (“[G]amers mentioned the ineffectiveness of obvious, out-of-
context, or saturated use of placements as opposed to a few, unobtrusive brands. Gamers’ comments 
reflected similar themes noted by film-viewers (DeLorme and Reid 1999). Placements are deemed 
to be effective when used in subtle ways (players assume subliminal processing). However, when 
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used without artistic justification, consumers seeking an explanation for a 
mark’s depiction are more likely to believe that the use is sponsored—
falling back on their background knowledge that product placement is 
commonplace and that some content creators blur unauthorized marks to 
avoid creating the impression of a connection between the mark and the 
content—and to think poorly of the underlying brand.212  
In contrast, when a mark is used with artistic justification—for 
example, when the use of the mark fits into its context as a reflection of 
authenticity (i.e., verisimilitude), when the use of the mark makes a 
symbolic or artistic point relating to the cultural meaning of a mark or its 
underlying product or service, or when the mark is part of an effective 
parody213—consumers are not only less likely to assume that the mark was 
included as part of product placement, but are also more likely to come 
away with a positive recollection of the mark, regardless of whether the 
depiction was positive or negative.214  
                                                                                                                     
the placements are used in inappropriate ways, the players consciously reject the placements.”); id. 
at 87 (“If the advertisements were poorly placed or did not match reality—then the advertisements 
actually deterred from the game experience; however, if the advertisements were placed in scenes 
that matched real life, then the brands actually enhanced the game experience.” “Relevancy” was 
also found to be of particular importance for long-term recall of brands. Study participants objected 
to product placements in situations “where advertisements would be oddly placed, like in forests” or 
otherwise out-of-place, such as “[a] big flashing sign in Medieval Times . . . .”). 
 212. DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 78; Savare, supra note 7, at 358 n.174 (noting 
interviews reflecting widely held belief that most product placements are “gratuitous” and any 
verisimilitude stemming from product placement is “simply an excuse to accept money.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 213. To be effective, “[a] parody must convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages: 
that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.” Louis Vuitton 
Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
 214. See Russell, supra note 209, at 308–09; see also Thompson Remarks, upra note 115 
(“We did one episode where we made fun of the product, and [the markholders] were fine with it, 
and actually sales went up . . . It’s just when you try and shove something down [the audience’s] 
throats that they get very very upset.”); cf. Christian Schemer, et al., Does “Passing the 
Courvoisier” Always Pay Off?: Positive and Negative Evaluative Conditioning Effects of Brand 
Placements in Music Videos, 25 PSYCHOL. &  MARKETING 923, 935 (2008) (observing that 
placement of mark in work of negatively-perceived performer tended to have negative effect on 
brand attitude, among participants with a preference for the relevant type of music); Moonhee Yang 
& David R. Roskos-Ewoldsen, The Effectiveness of Brand Placements in the Movies: Levels of 
Placements, Explicit and Implicit Memory, and Brand-Choice Behavior, 57 J. OF COMM. 469, 483–
84 (2007) (reporting the results of a study showing that consumers preferred products shown in 
movies over products not shown in movies; evidence indicated that positive effect was greater for 
products used by main characters over those that were involved in the plot but not used by main 
characters; authors suggest that “unusual and somewhat negative” depiction of product may 
influence viewers’ preference, but also suggest that preference may be based on whether product is 
used in a way consistent with “how the [product] is normally used[,]” implying that uses for 
verisimilitude, symbolism, parody, or other artistically relevant purposes would result in greater 
positive influence than artistically gratuitous uses). 
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These studies indicate that likelihood of confusion is tied to trademark 
harm—but not in the way conceived by the current likelihood of confusion 
framework.215 In particular, the current likelihood of confusion framework 
chills artistically relevant (and thus potentially beneficial) positive uses, 
but is likely to permit artistically gratuitous (and thus potentially harmful) 
negative uses. 
2.  Fostering Overprotection and Underprotection Through 
Ambiguity 
Ambiguities in the law encourage the culture of risk aversion and over-
licensing that breeds overprotection. The Lanham Act defines confusion 
expansively to include confusion as to sponsorship, approval, or 
affiliation,216 and courts have expanded that definition further: a use is 
defined as confusing if it permits consumers to infer “some connection” 
between markholder and alleged infringer,217 or believe that the 
markholder “‘goes along’ with” the use of the mark.218 More influential, 
however, is the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis’ reliance on 
consumer perception. As the First Circuit explained in Boston Athletic 
Association v. Sullivan, the difficulty in relying on a factfinder’s 
assessment of whether a particular product is sponsored or approved by a 
markholder is that it depends on the factfinder’s own belief regarding what 
the law requires: 
Lacking such knowledge, the question of approval is pure 
guesswork. To ask a factfinder to determine whether the 
public would think that defendants’ shirts were “authorized” 
or “official” shirts is to ask it to resolve a confusing and, in 
many contexts, virtually meaningless question. Asking a 
factfinder to make such a determination also raises a problem 
                                                                                                                     
 215. There is an additional type of trademark harm, beyond loss of goodwill: a markholder’s 
loss of control over its mark. However, the right to control one’s mark is limited to circumstances in 
which consumers are likely to be confused. Markholders also do not have the right to control 
nominative fair uses of their marks, as discussed below. See infra Part III.A.3.b. This is because a 
trademark is not a right in gross—it is only the right to the goodwill associated with the source 
identifying function of one’s mark. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. I posit, therefore, that 
a use that violates a markholder’s right to control its mark but does not harm the mark’s goodwill, 
much like a tree falling in an unoccupied forest, does not cause trademark harm.  
 216. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 217. See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 218. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400–01 (8th Cir. 1987) (basing decision 
on whether consumers were likely to believe that markholder “went along with” the use of the 
mark); see also Gibson, supra note 5, at 909–10 (discussing the expanding effect of imprecise 
vocabulary and marshaling cases’ reliance on expansive and ambiguous terms such as 
“endorsement,” “affiliation,” “association,” “connection,” “authorization,” “permission,” “license, 
“of any kind,” “otherwise,” “in some other way,” “of some sort,” “in some way,” and “in some 
fashion”). 
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of circularity: “If consumers think that most uses of a 
trademark require authorization, then in fact they will require 
authorization because the owner can enjoin consumer 
confusion caused by unpermitted uses or charge for licenses. 
And if owners can sue to stop unauthorized uses, then only 
authorized uses will be seen by consumers, creating or 
reinforcing the perception that authorization is necessary. This 
is a ‘chicken and the egg’ conundrum.”219 
In the entertainment context, when consumers are increasingly likely to 
believe that all trademark uses must be authorized by the markholder, this 
“chicken and the egg conundrum” expands the risk of liability. Increased 
risk then leads to over-licensing, which feeds back into consumer 
assumptions. 
The applicability of dilution law to trademark uses in expressive works 
is similarly ambiguous, both in its commerciality requirement and in its 
definition of tarnishment.220 These ambiguities not only compound the risk 
aversion and over-licensing discussed above, but may also (ironically) lead 
to underprotection of trademarks by the courts.  
First, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) exempts from 
dilution liability all “noncommercial” trademark uses.221 To the extent that 
courts have addressed whether the use of a mark in an expressive context is 
subject to the exemption, they have generally held that such uses are not 
commercial.222 For example, the Ninth Circuit held in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA 
Records, Inc. that the band Aqua’s use of the “Barbie” mark in the song 
Barbie Girl was non-commercial (and thus not subject to dilution liability) 
because it did more than simply propose a commercial transaction.223 Few 
courts have addressed the question, however, and ultimately it remains 
subject to debate.224  
Commentators are divided regarding whether trademark uses in 
entertainment constitute commercial speech.225 At the heart of the debate 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 33, quoting 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 24:3, at 170. 
 220. See generally Smith, supra note 57 (discussing inconsistency in application of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act and state dilution laws when free speech defenses have been proffered). 
 221. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006). 
 222. But see American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 
1998) (holding the film title “Dairy Queens” was commercial speech). 
 223. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906-07 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Burnett 
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966, 973–74 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding 
that references to Carol Burnett in the Fox television show Family Guy was non-commercial and 
thus not subject to dilution liability). 
 224. For example, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–22 (C.D. Ill. 
2003) and Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260–62 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) each held that no dilution had occurred without addressing the non-commerciality question. 
 225. See, e.g., Gulasekaram, supra note 6, at 933–42; Savare, supra note 7, at 369–75 (arguing 
that product placements should be classified as commercial speech); Snyder, supra note 152, at 
302–03, 321–27. 
49
Rosenblatt: Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
1060 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
regarding whether product placement constitutes commercial speech is 
whether the standards for commerciality should be applied to the work as a 
whole or to the purpose behind the work’s use of a particular mark.226 If 
the work as a whole is analyzed, any use of a mark in any expressive work 
would be immune from dilution liability. As entertainment and advertising 
merge, however, this line becomes fuzzier. Take, for example, BMW’s 
series of short films entitled The Hire, which told complete episodic stories 
while incidentally demonstrating various aspects of BMW’s vehicles and 
building BMW’s brand identity.227 Few would argue that these films are 
not expressive, yet they exist for an advertising purpose. Should the use of 
marks in such advertisements be analyzed any differently from the use of 
marks in more traditional entertainment, when much of that entertainment 
exists only as a result of product placement, and the markholder control 
that accompanies it?228 To the markholder, entertainment containing 
product placement has as commercial a purpose as The Hire, and to the 
consumer it is just as expressive.  
The sounder approach would be to analyze the expressiveness of the 
mark use (rather than the expressiveness of the work as a whole), so that 
uses that do nothing more than propose a commercial transaction are 
commercial, and uses that have some non-advertising expressive effect 
would be non-commercial. Thus, product placements without artistic 
relevance would qualify as commercial speech even when incorporated 
into the most expressive works, and artistically relevant uses would qualify 
as non-commercial even when authorized or placed in exchange for goods 
or fees. This approach would be consistent with the holding in Mattel, Inc. 
v. MCA Records, Inc.,229 and would be consistent with trademark law’s 
focus on consumer perception as the arbiter of liability.230 Perhaps most 
importantly for the present inquiry, it would also ensure that artistically 
relevant uses would be immune from dilution liability.  
Until the law is clarified, however, content creators cannot be confident 
                                                                                                                     
 226. See Savare, supra note 7, at 370 (criticizing Snyder’s analysis: “If we are to evaluate the 
constitutionality of governmental regulation of product placements in television, cable, or film, we 
must ask if product placements are commercial speech, not whether they transform creative 
expression into commercial speech.”). 
 227. Press Release, BMW North America, The Hire—The Acclaimed Film series by BMW—
Will End a Four and a Half Year Internet Run October 21st (Oct. 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.bmwusa.com/Standard/Content/Uniquely/TVAndNewMedia/BMWFilmpressrelease. 
aspx. 
 228. Put differently, on what basis should the use of Dustin Hoffman’s persona in a fashion 
magazine editorial spread (humorously showing new clothes in a parody of the film Tootsie) be 
treated differently from the use of Vanna White’s persona in an advertisement for Samsung 
(humorously showing Samsung products in a parody of Wheel of Fortune)? See Mulcahy, supra 
note 7, at 47–49 (discussing two cases with conflicting results on the question of commercial 
speech). 
 229. 296 F.3d 894, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 230. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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of escaping dilution liability, and risk-averse content creators must be wary 
of dilution law notwithstanding what seems to some to be an explicit 
carve-out for their behavior. This compounds the speech-chilling effect.231  
Moreover, it is not enough merely to clarify the dilution law’s meaning 
of “noncommercial.”  Even a sound reading of the law may permit undue 
trademark harm. Perversely, this harm comes in the form of 
underprotection, because the law immunizes one type of use that may 
cause trademark harm—uses that are not sponsored advertising (and 
therefore are not commercial speech) but also are not artistically relevant 
(and therefore may lead to trademark harm). Current dilution law does not 
prevent harm that may be caused by this very narrow band of uses.  
Specifically, under the FTDA, dilution by tarnishment is defined as an 
“association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and 
a famous mark that harms the reputation of a famous mark.”232 On its face, 
this provision applies when a mark, identical or similar to the 
markholder’s, is used to designate the source of a product or service other 
than the markholder’s—not to deal with the situation in which a mark is 
being used to refer to the markholder’s own product or service, in a context 
that may cast the markholder itself in a negative light.233 Cases decided 
under a prior version of the FTDA held that tarnishment would occur 
“when the plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or 
is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke 
unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product.”234 This interpretation 
leaves a gap in protection that may permit potentially harmful uses, as 
when a product or service is depicted in a manner likely to evoke 
unflattering thoughts about the mark owner rather than the product.235  
Disney threaded this gap in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.236 The 
case dealt with the film George of the Jungle 2’s depiction of a number of 
Caterpillar bulldozers, which the villain’s henchmen use to attack the 
film’s jungle habitat.237 Caterpillar’s marks are clearly visible in at least 
one scene during which the narrator describes them as “deleterious dozers” 
and “maniacal machines.”238 The court held that tarnishment had not 
occurred because viewers were likely to understand that the sources of 
destruction were those manipulating the bulldozers rather than the 
                                                                                                                     
 231. See supra Part II.C.1, 3. 
 232. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006). 
 233. See id. 
 234. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 
 235. This is not to imply that all such potentially harmful uses should be barred, only that they 
escape dilution law as currently formulated. The benefits (e.g., free speech) of such uses may 
outweigh their harms. 
 236. 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 237. GEORGE OF THE JUNGLE 2 (Walt Disney Pictures 2003); Caterpillar, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 
917. 
 238. Id.  
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bulldozers themselves.239 Yet it seems implausible that viewers would not 
associate the Caterpillar brand with the destruction, even if they would not 
attribute the destruction to Caterpillar’s volition.  
Similarly, Paramount prevailed in the case of Wham-O, Inc. v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp.240 This case concerned a seventy-second portion 
of the film Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star in which the characters 
misuse a “Slip ‘N Slide” toy.241 Paramount Pictures used the slide scene in 
promotions for the film and created an interactive online game inspired by 
the scene.242 Wham-O argued that the film’s depiction tarnished the Slip 
‘N Slide mark.243 The court disagreed, holding that the depiction was not 
tarnishing because the injury arose from an explicit misuse of the 
product.244 Although the film may make the product seem “odd” or 
“absurd,” the court held, it would not create a negative association in 
consumers’ minds because it was clear that the product was not used in its 
intended manner.245 The court did not consider, however, whether viewers 
might make any association between the Slip ‘N Slide brand and the injury 
associated with it in the film.246  
Reasonable minds may disagree as to whether the uses in these cases 
actually caused harm to Caterpillar and Wham-O. Regardless, however, the 
court simply did not ask whether either film would create in consumers’ 
minds a negative association with the plaintiffs’ marks. This is not because 
either case was wrongly decided under current law; rather, current law does 
not admit the possibility that trademark harm might occur under such 
circumstances.  
To be clear, this does not counsel in favor of expanding current dilution 
law further into the realm of expressive speech. Doing so could create 
significant First Amendment problems in exchange for a relatively 
insignificant trademark benefit, and would only compound the problems 
created by risk aversion and rights expansion by giving content creators 
(and their insurance carriers) yet another ambiguous doctrine to be 
concerned about. However, an ideal system would address this potential 
underprotection while also resolving the overprotection fostered by the 
                                                                                                                     
 239. Id. at 922. 
 240. 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261–65 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 241. DICKIE ROBERTS: FORMER CHILD STAR (Paramount Pictures 2003).  The film features a 
former child star, played by David Spade, who feels he has missed out on youth, and hires a family 
to help him reclaim his childhood. The family kids introduce him to the Slip ‘N Slide toy, which he 
proceeds to misuse (i.e., attempting to use the slide without lubricating it with water, then over-
lubricating the slide with cooking oil, and slamming into a fence). Id.; Wham-O, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 
1257. 
 242. Id. at 1258. 
 243. Id. at 1261. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See id. 
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law’s ambiguity. 
3.  Relying on Unavailing Exceptions 
A number of current doctrines create exceptions to the traditional 
likelihood of confusion test, with the goal of preventing the law from 
unduly stifling speech. In theory, these doctrines should also help slow the 
“rights accretion” caused by the recursive effect of product placement and 
risk aversion.247 In reality, however, these doctrines have not resolved the 
problem, and may exacerbate it.248  
a.  “Classic” (Descriptive) Fair Use  
The statutory doctrine of “classic” fair use permits the use of 
descriptive marks used in a descriptive manner. Specifically, the Lanham 
Act provides that a use is permitted if it is “otherwise than as a mark” and 
is “the party’s individual name in his own business, or . . . the individual 
name of anyone in privity with such party, or . . . a term or device which is 
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods 
or services of such party, or their geographic origin . . . .”249 This doctrine 
permits Naturalizer to describe its pumps as feeling “like a sneaker,” 
despite Easy Spirit’s “feels like a sneaker” motto and permits a permanent 
makeup company to describe its service as using “microcolor” despite a 
competitor’s “Micro Colors” brand.250 
Thus, in theory, a film that features a fictitious television channel 
focused on true-crime stories should be able to describe the fictitious 
channel as “the crime channel”—even if such a description would create 
confusion between the channel in the movie and a real-life channel known 
as “The Crime Channel.” Yet this was not the case in Films of Distinction, 
Inc. v. Allegro Film Productions, Inc.,251 which concerned the use of the 
mark “Crime Channel” in the film Relative Fear. 252 The film centers on a 
boy who commits a series of crimes, including murder, after watching a 
television channel called the “Crime Channel.”253 This case demonstrates 
                                                                                                                     
 247. See Tushnet, supra note 195, at 353. 
 248. Indeed, the proliferation of fair-use type exceptions may be part of the problem, rather 
than part of the solution. As William McGeveran has discussed, the overlapping and ill-defined 
boundaries of trademark fair use exceptions have made it difficult for attorneys to provide confident 
trademark fair use advice, and have tended to exacerbate risk aversion. See McGeveran, supra note 
11, at 110–11.  
 249. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). 
 250. United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 197, 199–200 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that Naturalizer’s use of the phrase 
“feels like a sneaker” was classic fair use); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114–16, 124 (2004) (concerning “microcolor”). 
 251. 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 252. Id. at 1072–73. 
 253. Id. at 1073. 
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the limitations of the classic fair use in defending against trademark claims 
concerning the use of marks in entertainment. Although the film depicted 
the Crime Channel as fictional, the Central District of California denied 
defendants’ motion to dismiss because the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that 
the film’s Crime Channel was confusingly similar to, and infringed, the 
plaintiff’s “Crime Channel” mark.254 The court rejected the defense of 
classic fair use on the ground that the film’s use of “Crime Channel” was 
not “otherwise than as a mark”—that is, because they created a fictitious 
mark, the creators of Relative Fear could not rely on the classic fair use 
doctrine and could be liable for confusion-based infringement.255 
b.  Nominative Fair Use  
More relevant to most situations is the common-law doctrine of 
“nominative fair use,” which permits the use of a mark to describe the 
markholder’s good or service when: (a) the product or service in question 
is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (b) no more of the 
mark or marks is used than reasonably necessary to identify the product or 
service; and (c) the user does nothing that would, in conjunction with the 
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”256 
This doctrine permits, for example, stores to advertise what products they 
sell, and magazines to write news stories about branded products.257 When 
the nominative fair use doctrine is asserted, these three prongs are applied 
as a replacement to the traditional likelihood of confusion theory rather 
than an exception to it.258 Thus, in theory, the doctrine of nominative fair 
use should immunize a great many expressive uses of trademarks.259 It also 
has the advantage of minimizing reliance on consumers’ ease of confusion 
and awareness of product placement. In fact, more than one court has relied 
on the doctrine in immunizing an artistic content creator from liability for 
the use of distinctive trade dress.260 However, in practice, the existence of 
                                                                                                                     
 254. Id. at 1076–77. 
 255. Id. at 1076. The court rejected the nominative fair use defense for the same reason. Id. t 
1076–77. 
 256. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 257. Id. at 307–08. 
 258. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir. 
2005) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s test established in New Kids on the Block “replaces the ‘likelihood 
of confusion’ test for trademark cases where nominative fair use is asserted” (citing Cairns v. 
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted))). 
 259. Rebecca Tushnet adopts this approach, arguing that application of the nominative fair use 
doctrine, in conjunction with other existing trademark doctrines, should be sufficient to minimize 
trademark rights accretion as described by Gibson. Tushnet, supra note 195, at 357. 
 260. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d 792, 796, 808 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the use of 
Mattel’s distinctive Barbie trade dress in the photographic works entitled Foo Chain Barbie was 
nominative fair use); Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1255, 
1263 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the use of a Slip-N-Slide toy and reference to the toy by name 
in the film Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star was nominative fair use). 
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the nominative fair use doctrine, and even the application of the doctrine to 
immunize certain trademark uses, does not appear to have reduced the risk 
aversion that limits content creators’ ability to use trademarks as 
expressive tools.  
One reason for this is ambiguity in the law. By including the third 
prong, i.e. that the user of the mark may do nothing to imply sponsorship 
or endorsement by the markholder, the doctrine could be interpreted to be 
vulnerable to the feedback loop of consumer confusion in the same way as 
the traditional likelihood of confusion test. While the prong ostensibly 
applies only to actions other than the use of the mark itself,261 in the case of 
expressive uses, the context in which the mark is used may qualify as an 
implication of sponsorship. This interpretation is supported by the New
Kids on the Block case, which looked to the context of the use to determine 
whether it implied sponsorship and held that since the newspaper polls 
identified the New Kids on the Block in a way that could be described as 
critical, the use did not imply sponsorship.262 Under this interpretation, any 
negative use of a mark would be protected by the nominative fair use 
doctrine, while any positive use of a mark, and possibly any neutral use, 
could be found to imply sponsorship and thus infringe.263 This gap in the 
doctrine is not addressed by the Wham-O, Walking Mountain, or Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. ases, each of which concerned uses that (at 
least arguably) cast the mark and its underlying product in a negative 
light.264 Thus, the doctrine as applied leaves the fate of positive and neutral 
uses in flux and does nothing to diminish risk aversion concerning such 
uses. 
More important, however, is the doctrine’s burden-shifting effect. 
Although it is considered a replacement to the traditional likelihood of 
confusion doctrine rather than an exception to it, the nominative fair use 
analysis shifts the burden of proof from the markholder—who ordinarily 
                                                                                                                     
 261. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (articulating test as assessing 
defendant’s activity “in conjunction with the mark”); Walking Mountain, 353 F.2d at 811 (assessing 
defendant’s activity “in conjunction with use of the mark” for indicia of sponsorship or approval). 
 262. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 304, 308–09 (determining that neither newspaper 
announcement made an entirely positive statement about the New Kids on the Block—USA Today 
announced “New Kids on the Block are pop’s hottest group. Which of the five is your fave? Or are 
they a turn off?” and The Star announced “Now which kid is the sexiest?” and “Which of the New 
Kids on the Block would you most like to move next door? STAR wants to know which cool New 
Kid is the hottest with our readers”). 
 263. Note, however, that markholders themselves often license their marks for use in less-than-
positive contexts, like the New York transit offering condoms featuring their marks, or schools 
licensing their marks for “rivalry mascots.” Tushnet, supra note 195. 
 264. In Wham-O, the film Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star depicted the main character 
misusing the Slip-n-Slide and injuring himself, Wham-O, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 1255, 1257; in 
Walking Mountain, the Food Chain Barbie artistic work was critical of the ideal of vapid beauty the 
artist saw embodied by the Barbie doll, Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 811; in Mattel II, the Barbie 
Girl song depicted Barbie as flighty and promiscuous, 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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must prove that a likelihood of confusion exists—to the content creator, 
who now must prove that its use is not likely to confuse under the third 
prong of the test.265 This makes it more difficult for content creators to 
escape litigation at an early stage and therefore presumably tends to 
increase content creators’ and insurance carriers’ risk aversion. 
c.  Use as a Trademark 
A number of commentators have asserted that the Lanham Act imposes 
a requirement that only “trademark uses” of a mark may infringe.266 For the 
most part, courts have adopted this theory only in the context of Internet 
keyword advertising, holding that the use of a mark as a keyword trigger 
for an electronic advertising algorithm does not constitute a use of the 
mark as a trademark, that is, the mark is not presented to consumers as 
representing the source of a product or service.267 Outside the Internet 
keyword context, however, the theory has gained little traction with 
courts.268 James Gibson advances a species of this approach as a solution 
to trademark rights accretion, suggesting that expressive uses of marks are 
not “trademark uses” because when a mark is incorporated into an 
expressive work, the mark is not being used to brand (i.e., sell) the 
expressive work.269 He proposes that there should be no finding of 
infringement unless the court finds confusion as to whether the markholder 
sponsored or approved the expressive product as a whole (rather than 
merely the trademark use).270  
Superficially, “trademark use” theory would appear to resolve disputes 
                                                                                                                     
 265. See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1029 (C.D. 
Cal. 2006) (noting that, as a replacement for the traditional likelihood of confusion test, the 
nominative fair use concept of suggesting sponsorship merges into likelihood of confusion, and 
shifts the burden to defendants (citation omitted)); see also McGeveran, supra note 11, at 90–92 
(discussing burden-shifting effect and other flaws in nominative fair use test). 
 266. See Denicola, supra note 11, at 193–207; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, 
Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2007); 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 139, at 478. 
 267. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005). But see 
800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding that use as 
Internet keyword is trademark use). 
 268. One exception—perhaps unique in its adoption of this theory outside the Internet 
keyword context—is an unpublished disposition in Capp Enterprises v. Walt Disney Co., No. CV 
03-03357 ABC (RZx) (C.D. Cal. YEAR), concerning allegedly infringing references to “Sadie 
Hawkins Day” (a mark registered to Capp in connection with the comic strip “Li’l Abner”) in an 
episode of the television show Lizzie McGuire. The court dismissed Capp’s complaint on multiple 
grounds, including that “the mark was not used in a source-identifying (i.e. trademark) fashion.” 
Order re Defendants Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 7, July 21, 2003. 
 269. Gibson, supra note 5, at 949. 
 270. Gibson, supra note 5, at 949–50. The Caterpillar Court espoused this theory to some 
extent, basing its ruling in part on a holding that Disney was not trading on the popularity of the 
Caterpillar mark in order to sell the George of the Jungle 2 film. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney 
Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (C.D. Ill. 2003). 
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over uses of marks in expressive contexts because only the use of a mark 
as a mark would give rise to liability—in contrast to the use of a mark as 
an expressive tool. Deeper examination, however, reveals that Gibson’s 
theory will neither rescue most expressive uses of trademarks from liability 
nor diminish the feedback loop of trademark rights accretion. The 
markholders’ concern is seldom the belief that content creators are free-
riding on the value of a trademark in order to sell entertainment.271 Rather, 
the challenge of trademark use in entertainment is that to the extent that a 
consumer believes that a markholder has authorized the use of its mark, the 
consumer will also believe that the markholder sponsors or approves of the 
underlying work and/or the context in which the mark is used.272 Thus, 
Gibson’s theory creates a false dichotomy. As Rebecca Tushnet explains, 
“the requirement of ‘trademark use’ has difficulty dealing with the problem 
that consumers may reasonably believe that Coca-Cola is a sponsor of 
American Idol because its products appear on the show. If that isn’t 
trademark use, what is it?”273 This challenge grows as more consumers 
believe that any use of a mark requires markholder approval. 
Moreover, even if non-trademark-use could embrace every situation in 
which a mark is used in entertainment to refer to the markholder’s product 
(rather than to refer to the work as a whole), it would not necessarily clarify 
liability—it would just shift the question. Rather than asking whether 
consumers believe that the markholder sponsored or approved of the use, it 
would ask whether consumers believe that the markholders sponsored or 
approved of the work as a whole. Consumers are unlikely to be more 
reliable at performing that task than at assessing sponsorship of a particular 
use, especially considering the degree of control that markholders often 
exercise when they place or approve the use of marks,274 and considering 
that markholders themselves are known to produce entire works—Hasbro 
is a co-producer of the Transformers films,275 Nike, Coca-Cola, and Ford 
                                                                                                                     
 271. But see Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452–58 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
song Rosa Parks used the civil rights icon’s name solely for the purpose of drawing attention to the 
work, rather than for an artistic purpose). 
 272. Lemley and McKenna propose a much more radical approach: the abolition of 
“sponsorship or approval” liability altogether, except to the extent that it is “materially” confusing 
(and thus constitutes false advertising). Lemley & McKenna, supra note 18. This approach is 
appealing in that it would eliminate much of the overprotection discussed herein, and help to curb 
over-litigation. It is far from a panacea, however. First, it exacerbates the likelihood of 
underprotection and harm from the artistically gratuitous misuse of marks in a way that may harm 
brand reputation or markholder image. Second, it still permits suits for dilution and false 
advertising, merely shifting the debate to whether confusion is “material.” This materiality prong 
could easily end up resting on the same recursive question of consumer perception as the consumer 
confusion test currently in place. 
 273. Tushnet, supra note 195, at 356. 
 274. See supra notes 190–91. 
 275. TRANSFORMERS (Dreamworks SKG 2007); TRANSFORMERS: REVENGE OF THE FALLEN  
(Dreamworks SKG 2009). 
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have adopted the role of program producers themselves,276 and BMW 
created The Hire.277 In other words, the question of trademark use would 
still be grounded in consumer understanding of sponsorship and trademark 
law, and share the same weaknesses as the traditional likelihood of 
confusion analysis.278 
d.  Regulatory Labeling Requirements 
In theory, for certain media, consumers should be aware of what uses 
are placed, and (by extension) be able to deduce which are not. In response 
to the payola scandals of the 1950s,279 the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) instituted rules requiring network television and radio 
stations to disclose any paid placements in a given program and list all 
sponsors of the program.280 This regulation is quite limited in its scope: 
First, of course, it applies only to broadcast television and radio.281 Second, 
the rule does not require disclosure if the placed products are donated, if 
the charge for exposure is nominal, or if the usage is for realistic effect.282 
                                                                                                                     
 276. See Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 83, 
96 (2006); Karrh et al., supra note 70 (citation omitted). 
 277. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 278. See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 79–80 (discussing weaknesses in trademark use 
theory). 
 279. Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the 
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1696 n.47 (1997). 
 280. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2002) mandates: 
(a) When a broadcast station transmits any matter for which money, service, or 
other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly paid or promised to, 
or charged or accepted by such station, the station, at the time of the broadcast, 
shall announce: 
(1) That such matter is sponsored, paid for, or furnished, either in whole or in 
part, and 
(2) By whom or on whose behalf such consideration was supplied 
. . . .  
 (f) In the case of broadcast matter advertising commercial products or 
services, an announcement stating the sponsor’s corporate or trade name, or the 
name of the sponsor’s product, when it is clear that the mention of the name of 
the product constitutes a sponsorship identification, shall be deemed sufficient 
for the purposes of this section and only one such announcement need be made 
at any time during the course of the broadcast. 
 281. In fact, the provision excludes works originally intended for theatrical release, even when 
aired on broadcast television. Id § 73.1212(h) (“Any announcement required by section 317(b) of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is waived with respect to feature motion picture film 
produced initially and primarily for theatre exhibition.”). 
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These FCC rules were designed to alert consumers of instances when 
products were placed so that consumers would not fall prey to surreptitious 
advertising; ironically, in light of the public’s growing awareness of 
product placement in the current media landscape, consumers may now be 
as likely to overestimate the proportion of products that are placed, rather 
than underestimating.  
Theoretically, the FCC rules could combat this new assumption because 
consumers might assume that products and services were not placed if they 
were not identified in a show’s credits. Realistically, however, this practice 
is unlikely to allay consumer confusion or diminish content creators’ risk 
aversion. Most people do not take great care in watching the credits of 
television programs, especially given contemporary broadcasting practices 
such as shrinking the credits and placing them in a split screen with 
previews or advertisements. In addition, an ample body of case law and 
survey evidence holds that inconspicuous disclaimers are ineffective at 
allaying confusion.283 
                                                                                                                     
Provided, however. That ‘service or other valuable consideration’ shall not 
include any service or property furnished either without or at a nominal charge 
for use on, or in connection with, a broadcast unless it is so furnished in 
consideration for an identification of any person, product, service, trademark, 
or brand name beyond an identification reasonably related to the use of such 
service or property on the broadcast. 
Id. (emphasis added). Noting the prevalence of product placement and the limitations in the FCC’s 
rules, some consumer advocacy groups have sought stricter regulation of the practice.  
For example, on March 29, 1989, the Center for Science in the Public Interest 
petitioned the FCC and the attorneys general in each state to require that paid 
product placements be disclosed in the credits of all movies. . . . [O]n May 30, 
1991, several public interest groups, including the Center for the Study of 
Commercialism, filed a petition with the [Federal Trade Commission] (FTC) to 
mandate that filmmakers must disclose paid product placements before a movie 
is shown. 
Savare, supra note 7, at 365. And on September 30, 2003, Commercial Alert petitioned both the 
FCC and the FTC for “prominent disclosures of product placement, product integration, plot 
placement, title placement, paid spokespersons, and virtual advertising on television.” Id. The FTC 
has explicitly rejected this request, but has noted that “if, through a product placement, false or 
misleading objective, material claims about a product’s attributes are made, the Commission can 
take action against the advertiser through an enforcement action pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC 
Act.” Richard A. Kurnit, Advertising and Promotion Liability (ALA-ABA Course of Study, Mar. 
18–19, 2009), WL SP050 ALI-ABA 383, 418. 
 283. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
§ 23:51 (4th ed. 2009). In fact, even conspicuous disclaimers are often ineffective, since they 
depend on short words and prefixes such as “not” and “un-”. In some instances, courts and studies 
have noted that the presence of a disclaimer aggravates rather than alleviates confusion. Id. For this 
reason, disclaimers are not a viable solution for content creators looking for a safe way to use marks 
without authorization. Nor would it be possible (or wise) for a legal system to base infringement on 
the presence or absence of disclaimers. First, as discussed, the disclaimers would be unlikely to 
allay confusion. Second, even if any individual disclaimer did help to alleviate confusion for any 
given unauthorized use, the practice of disclaiming authorization would actually tend to exacerbate 
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Moreover, even if consumers did pay close attention to credits, they 
could not fairly infer that all uncredited marks appear without 
authorization. Because the FCC requires notification only when 
promotional consideration has been provided,284 a wide array of placed 
products may go uncredited, such as those for which consideration was in-
kind (e.g. the markholder provided products or services to the production 
at little to no cost), or for which approval was obtained without 
consideration. Second, the FCC’s rules apply only to broadcast 
television.285 They do not (and cannot) apply to video games, music, 
written work, or even filmed entertainment that was created for venues 
other than broadcast television, such as theatrical release films or cable 
television productions.286 Thus, consumers have no consistent source of 
information from which they can learn to draw inferences regarding 
sponsorship, approval, or affiliation. 
In the face of pressure from consumer advocacy groups, the FCC is 
currently seeking suggestions for strengthening its product placement 
labeling requirements.287 Stronger FCC requirements are not likely to 
diminish the overprotection and underprotection of the current trademark 
scheme, however, because they cannot go far enough to clarify the law for 
consumers or content creators. First, the FCC has limited regulatory power. 
While the FCC may be able to mandate labeling of product placements in 
programming created for broadcast television and radio (and, possibly, 
cable television), the FCC lacks the power to regulate product placements 
in other media.288 Thus, even the most stringent and broadly-applied 
                                                                                                                     
consumer confusion on a wider scale, unless everyone adopted the same practice. That is, if only 
some content creators used disclaimers, consumers could easily come to ascribe meaning to the lack 
of a disclaimer, believing that any content without a disclaimer was sponsored or approved by the 
markholders. This would, in essence, convert an occasional practice into law, requiring content 
creators to include disclaimers. While this may be practical for certain types of work (television, 
feature films) it presents potentially insurmountable problems for others (still art, popular music). 
And even for media such as television and feature films, for which disclaimers could be included in 
credits, disclaimers will not allay confusion for viewers who see only a portion of the work unless 
they are included contemporaneously with the showing of the mark. But requiring contemporaneous 
disclaimers would be an outrageous burden on freedom of expression.  
 284. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(a). 
 285. Id. § 73.1212. 
 286. In fact, the provision excludes works originally intended for theatrical release, even when 
aired on broadcast television. Id. § 73.1212(h) (“Any announcement required by § 317(b) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is waived with respect to feature motion picture film 
produced initially and primarily for theatre exhibition.”). 
 287. Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,194, 
43,196 (July 24, 2008). 
 288. See Comments of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, In the Matter of 
Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, MB Docket No. 08-90, PLI Order 
No. 18101 (Jan.–Mar., 2009). 
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requirements would not be able to capture all authorized uses, and 
consumers would never be able to rely on credits to conclude definitively 
which mark uses were authorized. Second, as discussed above, disclaimers 
may be ineffective and many people simply will not pay attention to 
credits. This may not be a significant problem from a false advertising 
perspective—the labeling aids those who care about surreptitious 
advertising, and the remainder have only themselves to blame for their lack 
of knowledge—but whereas false advertising law punishes only false or 
misleading statements, trademark law may hold content creators liable for 
consumers’ misperceptions even when the accused infringer has made a 
full disclosure.  
e.  Rogers v. Grimaldi289 
Finally, some courts have explicitly addressed First Amendment 
concerns by applying the test set forth by the Second Circuit in the 1989 
case of Rogers v. Grimaldi.290 In that case, Ginger Rogers sued the 
producers of the film Ginger and Fred,291 alleging that the title of the film 
was likely to confuse consumers into believing that she sponsored, 
approved of, or was affiliated with the film.292 In reality, the film, which 
was created and directed by Federico Fellini, concerned two dancers who 
were nicknamed “Ginger and Fred” after the famous dancing duo.293 The 
court found that there was a likelihood of confusion based on traditional 
likelihood of confusion factors, but permitted the film to keep its 
potentially confusing title on the basis that the public interest in free 
expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding what the court 
viewed as a relatively small likelihood of confusion.294 In so doing, the 
court articulated the following balancing test to be applied to the titles of 
expressive works: a relatively small likelihood of confusion may be 
outweighed by the First Amendment, provided that the potentially 
confusing title is (1) artistically relevant to the underlying work and (2) not 
explicitly misleading.295  
Although Rogers remains binding precedent only for the Second 
Circuit, some other circuits have adopted its balancing test, albeit 
inconsistently.296 Some courts have interpreted the test narrowly, holding 
                                                                                                                     
 289. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 290. Id. at 999. 
 291. GINGER AND FRED (Bibo TV 1986). 
 292. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997. 
 293. Id. at 996–97. 
 294. Id. at 1001–02. 
 295. Id. at 999. 
 296. See supra note 55. Circuits that have adopted the test in some contexts have not uniformly 
applied the rule to all First Amendment claims. Compare Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books 
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403–06 (9th Cir. 1997) (relying on pre-Rogers cases to reject a First 
Amendment defense to trademark infringement regarding a book about O.J. Simpson styled after 
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that it may not apply to non-titular uses of marks, while others have 
applied it more broadly to the use of a mark in the body of an expressive 
work.297 Still others have refused to apply it at all, either ignoring it or 
hearkening back to the Dallas Cowboys case, in which the court held that a 
“trademark is in the nature of a property right, and as such it need not 
‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances 
where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.’”298 
Although the language of Rogers coincides with the artistic relevance 
criteria identified by the social science literature above, the Rogers test as 
articulated by the Second Circuit—and particularly, as interpreted by 
courts that have followed it—falls short of permitting uses that are 
artistically relevant and barring uses that are not (in fact, far from it). At its 
heart, the Rogers test is a balancing test which balances likelihood of 
confusion against the First Amendment interest in free expression.299 Thus, 
the Second Circuit and several other circuits that have adopted the Rogers 
balancing test have interpreted this to mean a “particularly compelling” 
likelihood of confusion may overcome the First Amendment interest in 
free expression.300 This modified version of the test requires completion of 
                                                                                                                     
The Cat in the Hat), and Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time Prods., B.V., 749 F. Supp. 1243, 
1252–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that Rogers does not apply to “confusingly similar titles” and 
holding that Rogers does not protect film Return from the River Kwai from claim by producers of 
Bridge on the River Kwai), with Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that First Amendment does not protect use of mark in parodic context when the 
use was likely to confuse and the “confusion [as opposed to the use of the mark] is wholly 
unnecessary to [the alleged infringer’s] stated purpose”) (emphasis added), and Cardtoons, L.C. v. 
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (suggesting the 
“likelihood of confusion” test “serve[s] to avoid First Amendment concerns” in the case of 
trademark parodies; holding First Amendment trumps any likelihood of confusion regarding parody 
baseball cards without applying the Rogers standard). 
 297. See supra note 56. 
 298. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 
1979) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have 
adopted the Rogers test, see, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Mattel II, 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 
F.3d 658, 664–65 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting Rogers standard with proviso that infringement will 
still be found if likelihood of confusion is “particularly compelling”); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999, and 
the Third Circuit has expressly declined to decide whether to adopt it, seeFacenda v. N.F.L. Films, 
Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (explicitly declining to decide whether to adopt Rogers 
standard). The question remains unsettled in other circuits. See, e.g., American Dairy Queen Corp. 
v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733–35 (D. Minn. 1998) (relying on “alternative avenues” 
test but referring to Rogers in discussion). 
 299. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (“We believe that in general the Act should be construed to apply 
to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the 
public interest in free expression.”). 
 300. The Second Circuit adopted the “particularly compelling” formulation in Twin Peaks 
Prods. v. Publ’ns Int’l., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993). In Twin Peaks, the court remanded a 
case on the basis that the district court, relying on R gers to find non-infringement by a book title, 
did not adequately consider whether there was likelihood of confusion that could nonetheless 
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the full multi-factor likelihood of confusion test first, then an analysis of 
First Amendment applicability, and only then a balancing of the two.301 For 
example, in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.,302 the Fifth 
Circuit held that there was a “particularly compelling” likelihood of 
confusion between the title “Polo” for a luxury lifestyle magazine and the 
Ralph Lauren “Polo” brand.303 This not only adds time and expense to any 
litigation, but also adds ambiguity to the test. With certain liminal 
exceptions, content creators are likely to know whether their use is 
artistically relevant or explicitly misleading, but it is much harder for them 
to assess—particularly in the current climate of doctrinal ambiguity and 
recursive rights accretion—whether their use creates a “particularly 
compelling” likelihood of confusion.304 
B.  Adjusting the Parameters 
Although the Rogers balancing test does not, in its current form, 
remedy the overprotection and potential underprotection built into the 
current trademark system, its focus on artistic relevance does provide the 
germ of a solution. Specifically, the “artistically relevant” prong of the 
Rogers test echoes the findings of social science literature that artistically 
gratuitous (i.e., incongruous) uses correlate with consumer confusion 
and—importantly—correlate even more closely with trademark harm—
than artistically relevant uses.305 
I propose, therefore, that the prongs of the Rogers test replace the 
                                                                                                                     
compel a finding of infringement. Id. The Fifth Circuit, and more than one district court in the 
Ninth, have followed suit. See, e.g., Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664–68 (5th Cir. 2000); Toho 
Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting First 
Amendment defense in part based on holding that likelihood of confusion regarding “Godzilla” title 
was particularly compelling); No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, 930 F. Supp. 1381, 1383–84 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995) (explicitly adopting Rogers test including balance against particularly compelling 
likelihood of confusion). 
 301. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1379. 
 302. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 303. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664–68. 
 304. Adding to the ambiguity of the as-applied Rogers test, some courts have interpreted the 
second (“not explicitly misleading”) prong as requiring a complete likelihood of confusion analysis, 
wherein a “particularly compelling” likelihood of confusion constitutes evidence that the use is 
explicitly misleading. See, e.g., Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1379 (conflating likelihood of confusion 
and explicitly misleading tests); Lemme v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 433, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (applying “particularly compelling” analysis of Polaroid factors to determine whether title 
was explicitly misleading); Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 
1068, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (interpreting Twin Peaks, in dicta, as having replaced the Rogers 
court’s “explicitly misleading” test with the “particularly compelling” analysis). This interpretation 
undercuts the original Rogers notion of a balancing test and tends to contradict the clear meaning of 
the word “explicit.” In contrast to these outlying cases, this paper construes “explicitly misleading” 
to have its ordinary meaning: a use is explicitly misleading when it makes an explicit and false 
statement of sponsorship or approval by the markholder. 
 305. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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traditional likelihood of confusion and dilution tests when marks are used 
in expressive works. Uses would be permitted unless they are not (1) 
artistically relevant to the underlying work or (2) explicitly misleading. 
Only those uses in expressive works that are artistically gratuitous or 
explicitly misleading, would be prohibited. 
This proposed test will eliminate the bulk of the uses most likely to 
cause trademark harm, while giving considerable leeway to content 
creators. “Artistically relevant” is a very liberal standard, permitting uses 
for purposes of authenticity, verisimilitude, symbolism, parody, and 
expediency, for example. The Ninth Circuit made clear in its recent E.S.S. 
Entertainment case that “only the use of a trademark with no artistic 
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever does not merit First 
Amendment protection. . . . In other words, the level of relevance merely 
must be above zero.”306 This “more than zero percent relevant” test implies 
(and I would make explicit) a presumption that a use is artistically relevant, 
which may be rebutted only by evidence that a reasonable consumer would 
perceive no artistic purpose for use of a mark.307 This analysis differs not 
only from the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis, but also from the 
                                                                                                                     
 306. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotations omitted). This interpretation is vastly preferable to the much more restrictive 
interpretation given to the phrase in Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450–58 (6th Cir. 
2003). In Parks, the Sixth Circuit found that the title Rosa Parks was not artistically relevant to a 
song that contained the phrase “move to the back of the bus” on the basis that the song was not 
about Rosa Parks, but was rather a bragging song about the artists themselves. Id. at 452–53. This 
holding was based in part on testimony from the artists themselves that the song was not about Rosa 
Parks. Id. One of the more significant problems with the holding in Parks was the court’s reliance 
on artist testimony because trademark harm is a matter of consumer perception; the question of 
artistic relevance, like the question of likelihood of confusion, must be assessed from the standpoint 
of the reasonable consumer, not the artist. Thus, while artist testimony may (under some 
circumstances) be admissible evidence of artistic relevance, it cannot be dispositive and may be 
unduly prejudicial. Under the more recent Ninth Circuit standard that I espouse, Parks would be 
decided differently: it seems implausible that a reasonable consumer would find the title Rosa Parks 
to be zero percent relevant to a song containing the phrase “move to the back of the bus.” 
 307. Under this test, the Caterpillar case presents one of the very few instances in which a 
court would likely find a lack of artistic relevance. That film concerned a fantasy world, not 
designed to represent or replicate real life, which the court described as a “live-action cartoon.” 
There was no reason for verisimilitude, and no other reason for the menacing bulldozers to be 
branded. Nor, in fact, was branding required by expediency: nearly every shot in which Caterpillar’s 
brand was visible could have been done with equal effectiveness without showing a brand name, 
simply by showing the right side of the bulldozer rather than the left. It is thus plausible that 
Caterpillar could have established a lack of artistic relevance for the use of the Caterpillar mark in 
that case. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Company, 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2003). In 
contrast, the contemporaneous Wham-O case would likely remain unchanged under this proposal, 
as the movie had an artistically relevant purpose for showing the trade dress of the Slip-n-Slide 
toy—to show the main character learning to use a real world child’s toy—and the use of the toy’s 
name in dialog (while it may be slightly less important from an artistic standpoint) would constitute 
nominative fair use. Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. Cal. 
2003). 
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analysis in the Dallas Cowboys case, which holds that the First 
Amendment does not protect the use of a mark when “adequate alternative 
avenues of communication exist.”308 The Dallas Cowboys rule would 
create a presumption of infringement in any case in which adequate 
alternative avenues of communication exist, regardless of whether the use 
of the mark caused confusion or trademark harm. In contrast, the test 
proposed herein would create a presumption of non-infringement, 
rebuttable only by evidence that the use of a mark was artistically 
irrelevant or explicitly misleading.309 
Similarly, the limitation that misleading uses will be prohibited only if 
they are explicitly misleading means that content creators need only avoid 
explicit statements of sponsorship, affiliation, and approval, and need not 
be concerned with the degree to which consumers could infer sponsorship, 
affiliation, or approval from any given use. Nevertheless, this prong insures 
that a likelihood of confusion will be found if a work contains false 
representations about sponsorship, approval, or affiliation.310 This prevents 
uses that, even if artistically relevant, are sure to mislead the consumer into 
believing that the use has been sponsored or approved by the markholder. 
While such uses are likely to be rare, they may occur when the expressive 
work states falsely that the markholder has sponsored the mark’s 
appearance or explicitly calls out the mark as part of promoting the 
work.311 Thus, even when a mark is used in an artistically relevant way, 
content creators will not be able to mislead consumers regarding 
sponsorship. 
                                                                                                                     
 308. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 
1979). Commentators have rightly criticized the Dallas Cowboys case on the basis that its rule 
would create a property-type right in trademarks, subject to trespass even in the absence of 
trademark harm, in conflict with the tenet that a trademark is not a right in gross. See, e.g., 
Gulasekaram, supra note 6, at 890–91. 
 309. This is not to say, however, that Dallas Cowboys would have come out differently under 
the proposed analysis. At the outset, the packaging for the film Debbie Does Dallas was explicitly 
misleading in its statement that the film featured an “Ex Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader” (when “Dallas 
Cowgirl” was a known nickname for the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleading organization). Even if the 
packaging were not explicitly misleading, the case contained no indication that the film’s costuming 
use of uniforms strikingly similar to those worn by the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders had any 
artistic relevance whatsoever. Id Thus, it is plausible to believe that the Dallas Cowboys could have 
rebutted a presumption of artistic relevance and established infringement even under the 
replacement test. 
 310. If, for example, the television show 30 Rock had not received payment from Verizon for 
featuring its product, the line “can we have our money now” would have explicitly misled viewers 
into believing that the mark’s appearance was sponsored. See supra note 102. 
 311. For example, the promotional statements at issue in Dallas Cowboys were that the film 
Debbie Does Dallas tarred an “Ex Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader” and that viewers would “do more 
than cheer for this X Dallas Cheerleader.”As the phrase “Dallas Cowgirl” is commonly used to refer 
to Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, the promotion explicitly misled viewers into the false impression 
that the film featured a (current or former) Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d 
at 203. 
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The proposed replacement test would improve upon the current system 
in a number of ways. First, it avoids overprotection and underprotection by 
focusing on the uses most likely to cause trademark harm, rather than the 
uses most likely to cause confusion. This permits uses that might confuse 
but be innocuous or beneficial from the perspective of trademark value, 
while prohibiting uses that are not likely to confuse, but are likely to cause 
trademark harm, such as gratuitous negative depictions of marks.312 Thus, 
it would address both the underprotection and overprotection issues 
discussed above. Uses that are unlikely to cause confusion harm would be 
permitted, without diminishing the scope of the likelihood of confusion 
standard (as it applies to non-expressive uses). Along the same lines, uses 
that are most likely to cause tarnishment-type harm (i.e., artistically 
gratuitous uses) will be newly captured by the replacement test, without 
requiring any expansion to the scope of likelihood of confusion or dilution 
law. Since artistically relevant uses will be permitted, the rule will not 
undermine the policy behind dilution law’s exception for non-commercial 
uses.  
In addition, the replacement test would identify uses likely to cause 
trademark harm, without having to rely on consumers’ shifting awareness 
of product placement and mark licensing to define the scope of protection. 
It would also avoid the distortive effect of relying on consumers’ own 
understanding of the law to define the scope of protection.313 These 
benefits would, in turn, reduce the recursive growth effect of consumer 
knowledge on the scope of trademark protection. Along the same lines, it 
would also reduce the need for some of the expression-constraining risk-
averse behaviors that feed that recursive growth, such as blurring marks 
and creating brand-less replacement goods. In the circumstances under 
which conspicuous avoidance of brands is most common (for example, 
documentaries, demonstration shows, music video scenes of street or club 
life), such uses would be artistically relevant for purposes of verisimilitude, 
and therefore permitted. This does not mean that content creators will 
never wish to blur marks or avoid brands—they may want to avoid giving 
free publicity to a brand, for example, or they may want to convey an 
atmosphere of brandless-ness or unreality—but it makes these decisions 
choices, rather than necessities. And when content creators do choose to 
engage in conspicuous avoidance of branding, it will not have the effect of 
expanding trademark law. 
The move from an ambiguous standard to a brighter-line rule also 
improves predictability. Much has been written about the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of rules versus standards.314 The central axis 
                                                                                                                     
 312. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 313. See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989), quoting 2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 24:3, at 170. 
 314. The literature on this topic is extensive. S e, e.g, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: 
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of this long-standing debate is the trade-off between predictability and 
flexibility: as defined, “rules” are bright-line prescriptions or proscriptions, 
while “standards” are case-by-case decision-making criteria. (Contrast, for 
example, a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit with one that requires drivers to 
maintain a “safe” speed.) Both rules and standards are subject to critique—
rules are predictable and inexpensive to enforce, but their lack of flexibility 
may lead to inappropriate or costly outcomes. By the same token, standards 
are better tailored to individual outcomes, but are more costly to enforce, 
and are also subject to the costs associated with unpredictability and 
uncertainty. The likelihood of confusion system currently in place is, for 
the most part, a standard. Its flexibility may be a virtue when assessing 
individualized and fact-specific cases of passing off, when courts may be 
required to exercise discretion. When transposed into the context of 
expressive works, however, that same flexibility and unpredictability lead 
to risk aversion and chilled speech. A preferable system would embody the 
advantages of both rules and standards: it would predictably permit most 
uses (alleviating risk aversion), while retaining the flexibility to prohibit 
uses that will cause trademark harm. To this end, the replacement test I 
propose for evaluating trademark uses in the context of expressive works 
more closely resembles a rule, although it continues to embed the (mildly) 
subjective artistic relevance standard.315 
The proposed replacement test’s improved predictability also stems, in 
large part, from enhanced clarity. By asking only whether a use is 
artistically relevant or explicitly misleading, the test is simpler and more 
easily applied. It avoids the morass of the Sl ekcraft multi-factor test, 
which is a poor fit for questions of sponsorship or approval (having been 
designed to address cases of passing off),316 and shuns the expansive 
vagueness of courts that have asked directly whether a use has signaled 
“some connection” between markholder and alleged infringer,317 or could 
lead consumers to believe that the markholder “goes along” with the use of 
the mark.318 As James Gibson has discussed in detail, much of the current 
                                                                                                                     
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and 
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783–91 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and 
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592–93 (1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 
33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
The debate has taken hold in the copyright and patent literature, as well. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (Nov. 2003); Michael W. 
Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (May 2007) (copyright). In contrast, there has been 
relatively little discussion of rules versus standards in the trademark context. Cf. Dinwoodie & 
Janis, supra note 266. 
 315. See Korobkin, supra note 314, at 27–28 (discussing rule-standard spectrum).  
 316. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra, 
Part I. 
 317. See, e.g., Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 34. 
 318. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400–01 (8th Cir. 1987). See also 
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problem with rights accretion can be traced in large part to ambiguity—
because the Sleekcraft test does not map well onto expressive uses of 
marks and because courts use imprecise language, content creators and 
insurance carriers do not know what the law is, and trend toward risk 
aversion. 319 Increased clarity in the law would tend to reverse that trend 
because if the law is more predictable, content creators will feel freer to 
use marks in appropriate contexts.  
This is not to say that the replacement test lacks ambiguity, which is a 
price of maintaining flexibility.320 Whether a use is “artistically relevant”—
even using the extremely liberal standard for artistic relevance set by the 
Ninth Circuit—is a subjective question that some might hesitate to leave in 
the hands of the courts. The application of a presumption of artistic 
relevance takes much of the subjectivity out of the hands of the court, 
however, as does the requirement that only explicitly misleading uses will 
qualify as misleading. Moreover, even to the extent that some ambiguity 
remains, the artistic relevance test is no more ambiguous than the test 
currently in effect. In the First Amendment context—which most, if not all, 
of the cases to be addressed by the replacement test would fit into—the 
Rogers approach would force a court to answer the question of artistic 
relevance anyway. What the replacement test does, in addition to adding a 
                                                                                                                     
Gibson, supra note 5, at 909 (discussing the expanding effect of imprecise vocabulary and 
marshaling cases’ reliance on expansive and ambiguous terms such as “endorsement,” “affiliation,” 
“association,” “connection,” “authorization,” “permission,” “license, “of any kind,” “otherwise,” 
“in some other way,” “of some sort, “in some way,” and “in some fashion”). 
 319. Gibson has advocated increased litigation as a tool for clarifying the law. As more courts 
interpret the law, he suggests, content creators will develop an understanding of which uses are 
permitted, and which uses are not. Gibson, supra note 5, at 939–42. But increased litigation is at 
best a slow route to improvement, and at worst an aggravating factor as courts decide cases 
inconsistently and open up greater ambiguities in the law. In addition, lowering barriers to litigation 
will only increase content creators’ fear of litigation. In the “license, don’t litigate” culture of 
entertainment, the prospect of litigation is stifling even when that litigation is likely to have a 
favorable result. In addition, a rise in litigation does not necessarily lead to a rise in court rulings. 
Most cases regarding the use of marks in films settle before receiving an order on the merits (but not 
after both parties have incurred significant expense). S e Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 80, 
at 14 (“There are, however, surprisingly few cases involving disputes over the unauthorized use of 
trademarked products in entertainment programming because many of them are settled out of 
court.”). Regardless, giving content creators the choice between licensing and litigation continues to 
increase transaction costs in a way that disproportionately harms small and independent content 
creators. It would be preferable to clarify the law in a way that does not require the threat of cash 
outlay by content creators. 
 320. William McGeveran has discussed a number of ambiguities and perceived flaws with the 
Rogers test in his article Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 11, at 100–04. Perhaps the 
greatest of these, that “confusion avoidance apparently has dropped out of the standard,” is 
addressed by the social science research discussed above. The majority of his other critiques are 
resolved by applying a presumption of artistic relevance and divorcing the two-prong test from the 
balancing procedure described in Rogers and its progeny. Without doubt, however, the test I 
propose maintains a certain level of ambiguity. I posit, however, that that ambiguity is both 
unavoidable and relatively mild. 
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presumption of artistic relevance, is eliminate the second layer of 
ambiguity from such cases by removing the likelihood of confusion 
balancing analysis from the Rogers test.  
The combination of a simpler, clearer rule and a presumption of artistic 
relevance will also discourage aggressive litigation, which in turn will help 
alleviate risk aversion. Much of the current problem is caused not by the 
breadth of the law per se, but by markholders’ perception that the law is 
broad enough to permit widespread enforcement, and the responsiveness 
(to the point of anticipatory avoidance) of content creators and insurance 
carriers to threats of enforcement. Traditional responses to these concerns 
include fee-shifting and reduced penalties. James Gibson, for example, 
proposes shifting penalties for expressive trademark violations away from 
injunctive relief.321 These options, however, are inadvisable here; fee 
shifting (whether under an “exceptional case” rule, similar to that already 
in place, or a more generous “loser-pays” system) takes away some of the 
incentive for plaintiffs to roll the dice on marginal cases, but still permits 
optimistic plaintiffs to believe that they will never have to pay more than 
their own fees. In addition, fee-shifting takes place too late, after litigation 
has ended and a defendant has already had to shoulder all of the expense of 
 litigation defense (even a successful one). Thus, while it may discourage 
some frivolous litigation on the margins, fee shifting is unlikely to resolve 
the risk aversion problem.  
Limiting the availability of injunctive relief is even more problematic in 
the trademark context because injunctions are at the core of trademark 
relief. Unlike other intellectual property violations, the loss of goodwill 
from exposure is the harm of trademark infringement, so the remedy for 
trademark infringement, with certain exceptions, is the cessation of 
infringement.322 In cases of passing off, some losses may be compensable 
along the lines of lost profits, but such compensation is difficult to assess 
and is generally not available except in cases of willful infringement (when 
treble damages and attorney fees are available).323 Thus, to discourage 
excessive litigation in this context, the best approach is to make the 
prospect of profiting from borderline litigation less likely for plaintiffs. The 
presumption accomplishes this goal. By clarifying which uses are and are 
not permitted, the replacement test better allows borderline and infringing 
cases to be identified and frees up resources that can be used for licensing 
them—as opposed to using those funds for licensing clearly permissible 
uses or for fighting over clearly impermissible uses. 
                                                                                                                     
 321. Gibson, supra note 5, at 943–44. 
 322. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting 
injunction is “the remedy of choice for trademark” cases). 
 323. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (providing for lost profits, damages, and costs, as well as treble 
damages and attorney fees for willful infringement); seeBanjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 
168, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting willfulness not required, but still a factor, in assessing whether 
damages are available). 
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To the extent that consumers believe that every use of a mark in an 
expressive work represents a sponsored or approved use, this test would 
abide a certain amount of consumer confusion, on the theory that such 
confusion is unlikely to cause trademark harm. In this way, it differs 
significantly from the Rogers balancing test on which it is based. The 
Rogers test (as most courts apply it) would evaluate artistic relevance—and 
then would add another layer of inquiry, asking whether there is a 
“particularly compelling” likelihood of confusion that might outweigh the 
free-expression interest in the artistically relevant use of a mark. But this 
additional step is both unnecessary and harmful. It is unnecessary, because 
while it might identify additional confusing uses, it will not identify 
additional harmful ones.324 It is also harmful because it injects the 
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis back into the mix—and with it, 
all of the ambiguity, risk aversion, and rights-expansion of that analysis.  
The proposed replacement test may also tolerate a certain amount of 
trademark harm, to the extent that the “artistically relevant” standard does 
not map perfectly on to the social science concept of “congruence.” 
Specifically, uses that do not qualify as artistically relevant under the 
liberal standard described here (for example, the gratuitous use of a 
modern-day brand in a period piece) will almost certainly be incongruent; 
however, the liberal standard for artistic relevance may occasionally permit 
some incongruent uses as well (for example, focus on a branded product 
for the purpose of making an artistically relevant reference to the brand’s 
cultural meaning, when the product would otherwise serve an accessory 
role to the story). Although these artistically relevant incongruous uses may 
create some consumer confusion and trademark harm, the benefits to free 
expression far outweigh the likelihood of confusion in such instances. The 
(relatively few) incongruent uses that will be allowed under this standard 
are those consistent with the policy that trademark law should not be able 
to remove brands and their cultural meanings from the collective 
vocabulary. Moreover, as such uses become expressly permitted and thus 
more commonplace, consumer assumptions regarding product placement 
will gradually shift to include a concept of brand reference outside of 
product placement. This will allay any confusing or harmful effect that 
such uses might have.325 Thus, any confusion that would be permitted by 
this test—even if it may occasionally lead to a small degree of trademark 




                                                                                                                     
 324. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 325. See, e.g., DeLorme & Reid, supra note 64, at 77, 79 (indicating negative consumer 
responses due to incongruence are generally tied to assumptions regarding promotion intent). 
70
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss5/6
2009] RETHINKING THE PARAMETERS OF TRADEMARK USE IN ENTERTAINMENT 1081 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The current trademark system, in conjunction with the “clearance 
culture,” chills expressive speech by overprotecting marks, while at the 
same time underprotecting against certain harmful uses of marks in the 
expressive context. Specifically, overprotection occurs as the scope of 
trademark protection grows recursively—the traditional likelihood of 
confusion test evaluates consumer confusion as to sponsorship or approval, 
which is more likely to happen as consumers become increasingly aware of 
product placement and mark licensing practices in entertainment. As a 
result of this expanding likelihood of confusion, risk-averse content 
creators are faced with a binary choice: sacrifice creative control to 
markholders or avoid the use of marks altogether. This has a speech-
chilling effect that falls disproportionately on small and independent 
content creators, who cannot afford to obtain authorization and cannot 
guarantee the audience required for product placement. Many risk-
avoidance techniques used by content creators, such as creating fake 
brands and blurring unauthorized marks, tend to reinforce consumers’ 
assumptions that all perceptible trademark uses are sponsored or approved 
by markholders. This, in turn, expands likelihood of confusion.  
At the same time, the trademark system underprotects marks by 
permitting uses—such as negative depictions of marks—that are unlikely 
to cause consumer confusion, but still likely to harm the mark. This occurs 
because the traditional likelihood of confusion test will not capture non-
confusing uses, and the traditional dilution test will capture neither non-
commercial uses (i.e., most unauthorized entertainment uses) nor uses 
likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s mark (rather than 
its product or service). This means that potentially harmful depictions of 
marks are allowed to continue, while benign (or even beneficial) uses are 
chilled. As a result, the system deprives content creators of the ability to 
use marks as expressive tools while continuing to leave markholders open 
to trademark harm. 
The current likelihood of confusion and dilution systems underlie this 
doctrinal imbalance, partly because they rely on ambiguous tests and 
exceptions, and partly because they focus on the wrong factors for 
identifying trademark harm. Recent studies indicate that consumer attitudes 
toward the use of trademarks in entertainment depend more on whether the 
use is artistically relevant than on whether the depiction satisfies the 
likelihood of confusion test. Specifically, when the use of a mark is 
incongruous with the underlying work (i.e., artistically irrelevant), 
consumers are not only likely to believe that the use of the mark is 
sponsored or approved by the markholder, but are also likely to develop 
negative attitudes toward the mark. In contrast, when the use of a mark is 
artistically relevant, consumers are likely to develop a positive attitude 
toward the mark regardless of whether the mark is depicted in a positive or 
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negative manner. 
Therefore, in this Article, I have proposed that when a mark is used in 
an expressive setting, the traditional likelihood of confusion tests should be 
replaced with a two-pronged test, under which an unauthorized use would 
be permitted unless the use is (1) not artistically relevant to the underlying 
work or (2) explicitly misleading. This test is based on factors identified in 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, but simplifies and clarifies that case’s analysis 
considerably by eliminating the need for a likelihood of confusion analysis 
and by applying a presumption of artistic relevance. This proposed test 
would permit the use of marks as expressive tools, while encouraging 
content creators to seek permission for uses that are more likely to harm a 
mark’s source-identifying function. In addition, this test would identify the 
uses most likely to cause trademark harm without relying on consumers’ 
shifting awareness of product placement and mark licensing to define the 
scope of protection. This, combined with the proposed test’s improved 
clarity and predictability, would reduce markholders’ incentives to litigate 
and mitigate content creators’ risk aversion, short-circuiting the vicious 
cycle of trademark rights expansion. 
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